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INTRODUCTION

In American political theory, a state constitution is the supreme, organic, and fundamental law of a state. It represents the will of the sovereign
people of a state and derives its force directly therefrom. A state constitution recognizes fundamental rights that ultimately reside with the people.
The instrument establishes the structure and parameters of state government. Also, a state constitution establishes fundamental government policy.'
Accordingly, a state constitution should serve as a well-tailored garment for its people. Of course, the instrument must be a "good fit" for the
present and the foreseeable future. Also, a state constitution must allow for
appropriate change to address evolving needs and conditions. For nearly
forty years, the 1970 Illinois Constitution has served Illinois as such a welltailored garment. The constitution itself ensures that it will not become a
straightjacket for the people of Illinois. The constitution directs that, at least
once every twenty years, the question of whether a state constitutional convention should be called must be submitted to the voters. In 1988, the first
automatic proposed call for a constitutional convention overwhelmingly
failed.3 The second automatic opportunity for Illinois voters to call for a

1. See James W. Hilliard, The Illinois Constitution: A Primer, 96 ILL. B.J. 494
(2008).
2.
ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1(b) ("If the question of whether a Convention should be
called is not submitted during any twenty-year period, the Secretary of State shall submit
such question at the general election in the twentieth year following the last submission.").
3.
The Illinois Attorney General opined that the farst automatic convention call
should be submitted to voters in 1988, rather than 1990, because a convention call was last
submitted to voters in 1968 and, therefore, 1988 would be the twentieth year following the
last submission. 1987 I11.Atty Gen. Op. 246. The automatic convention call failed, receiving
900,109 affirmative votes and 2,727,144 negative votes. See ILLINOIS BLUE BOOK 559
(George H. Ryan, ed., 1993-1994) [hereinafter RYAN'S ILLINOIS BLUE BOOK]; DAVID
KENNEY & BARBARA L. BROWN, BASIC ILLINOIS GOVERNMENT 236-41 (3d ed. 1993).
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state constitutional convention was at the November 2008 general election,
which also overwhelmingly failed.4
This article will explain the history, theory, and purposes of state constitutions in the American political system. The article will then recount the
background, framing, and ratification of the 1970 Illinois Constitution and
proceed to describe the contents of the Illinois Constitution, explaining how
the document fulfills the general purposes of state constitutions. This article
will demonstrate that the Illinois Constitution remains adaptable to new
situations and changing circumstances and will also relate a controversy
that ensued as a consequence of forgetting Illinois constitutional history.
The article will conclude that Illinois voters in 2008 correctly voted "NO"
in response to the call for a state constitutional convention because "if it
ain't broke, don't fix it." 5
II.

STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, locally known as "ConCon," did not draft the 1970 Illinois Constitution in a vacuum. To the contrary, no previous Illinois constitutional convention had the benefit of such
extensive preparation to facilitate its task.6 Several years prior to Con-Con,
the Illinois General Assembly created three successive constitution study
commissions, which ultimately produced several useful publications. 7 Also,
then-Governor, Richard B. Ogilvie, formed the Constitution Research
Group to prepare research papers to serve as background on major constitutional issues. These papers, published as Con-Con: Issues for the Illinois
ConstitutionalConvention, were issued to the general public8 and "proved
invaluable to the delegates." 9

The 2008 automatic convention call received 1,493,203 affirmative votes and
4.
3,062,724 negative votes. Illinois State Board of Elections, Official Vote Cast at the General
at
available
2008,
4,
Nov.
Election,
http://www.elections.state.il.us/Electionlnformation/StateQTotals.aspx?id=22.
5.
GREGORY TITELMAN, AMERICA'S POPULAR SAYINGS 152 (2d ed. 2003) ("Any
attempt to improve on a system that already works is pointless and may even be detrimental.").
JANE GALLOWAY BURESH, A FUNDAMENTAL GOAL: EDUCATION FOR THE PEOPLE
6.
OF ILLINOIS xv (1975).
7.
See, e.g., GEORGE D. BRADEN & RUBIN G. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION:
AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIvE ANALYSIS v-vii (1969); BURESH, supra note 6, at xv;
JANET CORNELIUS, CONSTITUTION MAKING INILLINOIS 1818-1870 ix (1972).
8. CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 151.
BURESH, supra note 6, at xv; see also People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 163 (Ill.
9.
1984) (Ward, J., concurring) ("The research papers should not be overlooked in any search
to determine the mind of the convention.").
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Con-Con was free to draft any form of fundamental document it
pleased, subject to federal constitutional limitations'0 and ratification by
Illinois voters;" however, convention delegates were well aware of the historical role and underlying political theory of state constitutions. The delegates were also aware of the general purposes of state constitutions in
American constitutional law.
A.

HISTORICAL ROLE

Con-Con delegates knew that state constitutions play a crucial role in
American constitutional law. The history of their development reveals how
state constitutions shaped American constitutional government. Broadly
speaking, a "constitution" can be defined as "that body of rules and maxims
in accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised."' 12 Thus, the term "constitution" can generally refer not only to a
written basic law, but also to "the fundamental principles which determine
the structure and operation of government ....

In this sense every people

which is politically organized has a constitution, however much it13may differ from the constitutions of other politically organized societies."'
But the term constitutional government is applied only to
those [governments] whose fundamental rules or maxims
not only locate the sovereign power in individuals or bodies designated or chosen in some prescribed manner, but
also define the limits of its exercise so as to protect individual rights, and shield them against the assumption of arbitrary power. The number of these [governments] is not
great, and the protection4 they afford to individual rights is
far from being uniform)

In other words, a constitution embodies a living, evolving system of
power relationships that have been effectively institutionalized. A living
10.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
11.
Paul G. Kauper, The State Constitution: Its Nature and Purpose, in CON-CON:
ISSUES FOR THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 3 (Samuel K. Gove et al. eds., 1970).

12.
1890).
13.

1954).
14.

THOMAS

M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

4 (6th ed.

CARL BRENT SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 10 (2d ed.

COOLEY, supra note 12, at 5.
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constitution can be written or5 unwritten; it can be embodied in several
documents, or even in custom.1
The concept of a written constitution, which defines the structure of
government and enumerates the rights of the people as a restraint on the
powers of government, has deep roots in Anglo-American history. 16 American constitutional government neither appeared on a clean slate, nor arose
as a counter-ideology to colonial government. Rather, American constitutional government "was the product of a political life that from the first
decades of colonization had evolved in close conjunction with political developments in the mother country."' 7 As history has shown, "the English
colonists in America brought with them a constitutional heritage which
molded colonial governmental institutions and continued in a high degree to
guide those of the United States."' 8 As will be explained, Great Britain does
not have a written constitution in the American sense; however, "English
history furnishes antecedents for the idea of reducing to writing, that all
may see and know, fundamental propositions relating to the liberty of the
citizen and determining the relationship between the government and the
governed." 19
B.

UNDERLYING POLITICAL THEORY

The axioms of popular sovereignty and the delegation thereof to government establish the underlying political theory of state constitutions.20
This political theory, which Con-Con delegates understood, explains the
necessity of state constitutions in the American federal system of government.

15.
CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 29-30 (4th
ed. 1968).
16.
Kauper, supra note 11, at 1.
17.
WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 8 (1980); see also
ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 110-11 (1965) ("The colonists
thought proudly of themselves as Englishmen; up to the eve of the War of Independence,
their grievances were expressed as denials of an Englishman's rights; their claims were
documented by English precedent.").
18.
SWISHER, supra note 13, at 9.
19.
Kauper, supra note 11, at 1-2.
20.
The following discussion is based on James W. Hilliard, To Accomplish Fairness and Justice: SubstantiveDue Process, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 95, 96-100 (1996).
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Sovereignty of the People and Their Civil Liberty

Sovereignty is defined as the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable
power; i.e., the absolute right to govern. 2' Sovereignty in government refers
22
to the public authority that sets the limits within which one may act. Sov-

ereignty refers to the supreme power that governs all citizens, and resides in
the person or body of persons in the state to whom there is no political superior. 23 "A State is called a sovereign State when this supreme power resides within itself, whether resting in a single individual, or in a number of
individuals, or in the whole body of the people. ' , 24 A comparison of the
British theory of government to the American theory of government reveals
the crucial importance of this underlying political theory in American constitutional law.
According to the British theory of government, sovereignty does not
reside in the people. The struggle between the Stuart kings and Parliament
for sovereignty demonstrates that British subjects never had it. Until the end
of the seventeenth century, all attributes of sovereignty resided in the monarch, who exercised all governmental powers incident to sovereignty: executive, legislative, and judicial.2 5 According to the Stuart kings, all power,
justice, and rights resided in the monarch and flowed therefrom. English
subjects did not possess "rights," strictly speaking; rather, English subjects
enjoyed mere privileges that directly or indirectly flowed by grace from the
sovereign. 26
21.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1568-69 (4th ed. 1968); accord BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1524 (9th ed. 2009) (defining sovereignty as "[s]upreme dominion, authority,
or rule").
22.
City of Bisbee v. Cochise County, 78 P.2d 982, 985-86 (Ariz. 1938); accord 2
BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY 3096 (8th ed. 1914) (collecting definitions); COOLEY, supra
note 12, at 4.
23.
Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 33 F. 900, 906 (W.D. Ark. 1888). Symbolizing concentrated power, the word "sovereignty" is derived from the word "sovereign,"
thereby connoting the holder of such power. FRIEDRICH, supra note 15, at 19.

24.

COOLEY,

supra note 12, at 4.

25.
See PHILLIP S. JAMES, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LAW 124 (9th ed. 1976);
E.C.S. WADE & A.W. BRADLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 65, 262 (11 th
ed. 1993); D.C.M. YARDLEY, INTRODUCTION TO BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 57-60 (7th
ed. 1990).
26.
See Indiana v. Schumacher, 164 N.E. 408, 409 (Ind. 1928); Wisconsin ex rel.
McGrael v. Phelps, 128 N.W. 1041, 1045 (Wis. 1910); see also FRANCESCA KLUG ET AL.,
THE THREE PILLARS OF LIBERTY: POLIICAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

110 (1996) ("Historically, individual immunities and liberties existed by grace of the Crown

and its servants."); CHARLES REMBAR, THE LAW OF THE LAND: THE EVOLUTION OF OUR
LEGAL SYSTEM 283 (1980) ("James I insists the royal power is absolute. Christ is God's

Vicar on Earth; each monarch is His minister. James therefore rules by Divine Right, and
frustration of his wishes is both heresy and treason.").
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Parliament eventually substituted itself for the monarch in wielding
sovereign power. 27 "In Britain, Parliament is sovereign, in the sense that
there are no constitutional limits to its authority., 28 "[S]ince Parliament is
'sovereign' it can, without any special procedure, and by simple Act, alter
any law at any time, however fundamental it may seem to be., 29 "Indeed,
the sovereign power of Parliament is traditionally and correctly described as
absolute, omnipotent, uncontrollable, and even transcendent."30 In the
United Kingdom today, "there are no such things as 'guaranteed' rights-as
there are in the U.S. Constitution--expressly safeguarded in a document of
peculiar sanctity. Since Parliament is all-powerful it may do anything by a
simple Act, and it may certainly deprive the individual of his rights ....
The civil liberties of British subjects do not rest on a written constitution,
but rather on the common law. Fundamental rights "rest simply on the ageas they like proold assumption by British courts that citizens are free to do
32
law.
the
of
breach
specific
any
commit
not
do
vided they
Scholars have questioned whether the British approach adequately
protects civil liberty.33 First, the government may violate a particular civil
liberty where the law does not prohibit the violation. 34 Second, commonlaw-protected liberty is especially subject to erosion. 35 The common law
merely recognizes that people are free to do anything that is not unlawful.
The common law is powerless to prevent Parliament from enacting new
restrictions. 36 Further, the common law imposes many restrictions upon
27.
WADE & BRADLEY, supra note 25, at 262-63; see also FRIEDRICH, supra note 15,
at 251 ("In England the supremacy of law merged with the supremacy of Parliament.").
28.
ANTHONY H. BIRCH, THE BRTISH SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 22 (10th ed. 1998);
see also WADE & BRADLEY, supra note 25, at 65-96.
29.
JAMES, supra note 25, at 105; see Anthony Lester, Fundamental Rights in the
United Kingdom: The Law and the British Constitution, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 337, 338 (1976)
("Parliament has the right to make or unmake any law whatsoever, and no person or body
has the right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament. We make no distinction
between laws that are not fundamental or constitutional and laws that are fundamental or
constitutional, and there is no supreme law against which to test the validity of other laws.").
30.
Hilliard, supra note 20, at 97 (internal quotation omitted); accord 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 156 (Dawsons of Pall Mall 1966)
(1765).
31.
JAMES, supra note 25, at 140.
32.
BIRCH, supra note 28, at 238; see also WADE & BRADLEY, supra note 25, at 410
("Under the common law, a wide measure of individual liberty was guaranteed by the principle that citizens are free to do as they like unless expressly prohibited by law.").
33.
KLUG, supra note 26, at 137 (describing the "systematic failure" of British governmental theory to "adequately protect political rights and freedoms in the United Kingdom"); WADE & BRADLEY, supra note 25,410-11.
34.
WADE & BRADLEY, supra note 25, 410-11.
35.
Id.
36.
KLUG, supra note 26, at 135 (observing that British courts, "through the practical effects of the overriding rule of parliamentary sovereignty . . . are thus bound to apply
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civil liberty. Sometimes it is convenient for the government, in order to
avoid enacting a statute that restricts civil liberty, to seek a judicial decision
that will develop the law restrictively and create a generally applicable legal
precedent.37
British constitutionalism was the impetus for the development of the
American concept of a constitution.38 American colonists initially protested
what they perceived to be violations of their rights under the constitution
and laws of Great Britain; however, the colonists' protest led them to question not only the authority of the British government, but eventually even
the British concept of a constitution. 39 The colonists formulated a new concept of a constitution that ultimately caused American political theory to
differ fundamentally from British political theory.4 °
British colonists settled in America pursuant to charters granted by the
Crown. Upon their arrival, it became necessary to establish in each colony
the basic framework of government according to the terms of that colony's
particular charter. 41 Examples include the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut of 1639 and the Frame of Government of Pennsylvania of 1682.42 These
colonial documents engendered the idea that a written document should
incorporate the basic structure and organization of government, with a declaration of the rights of the people. Further, these documents were "recognized to have a basic and organic character and, indeed, to have the quality
of a fundamental law superior to ordinary laws and enactments. ' ' 3 Significantly, the Mayflower Compact of 162044 "rested on the assumption that
men may by compact among themselves determine how they shall be governed. The idea that a constitution is a compact resting on agreement and
consent of the people is a fundamental facet of American political thinking.' A 5 Indeed, colonial charters were a major factor in the development of
state constitutions. Colonists invoked these familiar documents against the

any legislation which has passed properly through Parliament, even if it clearly violates
political rights and freedoms").
37.
WADE & BRADLEY, supra note 25, at 410-11.
38.
ADAMS, supra note 17, at 8-9.
39. Id.
40.

ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND

44.

THE MAYFLOWER COMPACT (Mass. 1620).

DEVELOPMENT 64 (6th ed. 1983).
41.
Kauper, supra note 11, at 2; see generally SUTHERLAND, supra note 17, at 11114 (describing development and structure of colonial governments).
42.
Kauper, supranote 11, at 2.
43.
Id.
45.

Kauper, supranote 11, at 2.
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arbitrary actions of royal governors. The colonists claimed the rights of
freeborn Englishmen.46
The American colonists "imbibed deeply" the political theory of philosophers such as John Locke and Baron Montesquieu. 47 "A new sense of
legitimacy had to be created by satisfying the principle of popular sovereignty as well as the basic demand of constitutionalism: the limitation of the
power of those in public office by a set of rules unalterable by the rulers. 48
The colonists "believed in natural law and the social contract, and they
wished to see their rights guaranteed and their theories translated into action
in the governments which they established. Written constitutions seemed to
be the best way to accomplish all these objectives. ' 49
The colonial struggle with Great Britain during the Revolutionary Era
provided a strong incentive for the colonies to adopt basic documents that
provided: (1) more complete statements of individual rights, and (2) greater
elaborations of forms of government resting on the consent of the people.
These basic colonial documents were the immediate predecessor of modern
state constitutions.5" In 1776 and 1777, "having declared their independence
of England, all but two of the thirteen colonies fashioned their own constiof popular
tutions.",51 "The written constitution thus became the expression
, ' 52
self-government.
of
right
people's
the
and
sovereignty
In contrast to the British theory of government, the American theory of
government posits that the people are the ultimate sovereign. All legitimate
authority flows from the people; all governmental power vests in the people.53 Rather than merely enjoying privileges flowing from a monarch or a
Harvey Walker, Myth and Reality in State Constitutional Development, in
5 (W. Brooke Graves ed., 1967).
Id.
47.
ADAMS, supra note 17, at 21.
48.
Walker, supra note 46, at 5.
49.
Walter F. Dodd, The Function of a State Constitution, 30 POL. Sci. Q. 201, 202
50.
(1915) ("Certainly the political philosophy of 1776 was based very largely on the notion of
social compact and did not recognize the existence of inherent governmental power in either
legislative, executive or judicial department."); see also Kauper, supra note 11, at 2.
Kauper, supra note 11, at 2. Additionally, "Connecticut and Rhode Island con51.
tinued to govern themselves under their old charters which had been liberally formed." Id. at
2 n.5. Connecticut acquired its first constitution in 1818. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. pmble., at
39 (West 2007) (historical notes). Before the American Revolution, and until the state constitution was adopted in 1842, an interregnum existed during which Rhode Island was governed by its colonial charter granted by King Charles II in 1663. Carl T. Bogus, A Radical
Decision by the RI. Supreme Court, 48 R.I.B.J. 13, 13-15 (1999); James Marusek, Decaying
Remnants of the Present Fabric:Rhode Island's Inflated Legislature, 48 R.I.B.J. 9, 10-11
(1999).
Kauper, supra note 11, at 2.
52.
Hawthorn v. Illinois, 109 111. 302, 306 (1883); accord Florida ex rel. Ayres v.
53.
Gray, 69 So. 2d 187, 193 (Fla. 1953); Field v. People ex rel. McClernand, 3 I11.(2 Scam.)
79, 81-82 (1839); Indiana v. Shumaker, 164 N.E. 408, 409 (Ind. 1928); David F. Epstein,
46.

MAJOR PROBLEMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
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Parliament, the sovereign people possess inherent and inalienable rights. 4
The essential characteristic of our federal system of government, as opposed to European governments, is the recognition of individual rights
against the state as a primary concern.55 Further, "Americans see a constitution as something which should rest upon a more certain basis than tradition, custom, and precedent. From the earliest days of the American experiment in government, the notion that the higher law'5 6should be written
law became a fundamental pillar of our political system."
2.

People's Creationof Government andRetention of Power

"American constitutional theory rests on the bedrock proposition that
no government is entitled to the people's complete trust and faith. The
founding generation understood the creation of any constitutional government to be an exercise in both necessity and distrust., 5 7 Obviously, one of
the purposes of government is to coerce people to behave as they should;
however, because those who govern are no more perfect than the governed,
it is equally obvious that government must be obligated to control itself.58
As the ultimate sovereign, the American people created constitutional
governments to protect themselves and their fundamental rights, and to
promote the common good. The people endowed government with such
powers and subjected it to such limitations as they saw fit.59 Judge Cooley's
cogent description remains instructive:
The theory of our political system is that the ultimate
sovereignty is in the people, from whom springs all legitimate authority. The people of the Union created a national
constitution, and conferred upon it powers of sovereignty
over certain subjects, and the people of each State created a
The Political Theory of the Constitution, in CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTION 78 (Allan
Bloom ed., 1990); Hilliard, supra note 20, at 97 n. 14 ("The term 'the people,' as a practical
matter, refers to qualified voters.").
54.
Nunnemacher v. Wisconsin, 108 N.W. 627, 629 (Wis. 1906); see State ex rel.
Brewster v. Knapp, 163 P. 181 (Kan. 1917) (observing that state legislature has no inherent
power; rather, its power derives from the people through state constitution); Epstein, supra
note 53, at 78-83.
55.
Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Union Sav. Bank Co., 163 N.E. 221, 222 (Ohio 1928).
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at xi; accord SUTHERLAND, supra note 17, at 6 (ob56.
serving that "the reduction of the fundamentals of our constitutional system to a written
statement" is "deeply rooted in our constitutional theory").
57.
JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 144 (2005).
58.
See id. at 144-45 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
59.
Florida ex rel. Ayres v. Gray, 69 So. 2d 187, 193 (Fla. 1953); Nunnemacher,
108 N.W. at 629; Hawthorn v. Illinois, 109 Ill. 302, 306 (1883).
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State government, to exercise the remaining powers of sovereignty so far as they were disposed to allow them to be
exercised at all.6°
Essentially, "the people retain those aspects of sovereignty
61 that they
did not choose to delegate to the federal or state governments."
The need for Americans to declare their retention of unenumerated
rights after the formation of government is evidenced by references thereto
in fundamental documents. Probably the most familiar is the Declarationof
Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are
created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." 62 Another familiar example is the Ninth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people. 63 Although "courts have almost universally rejected the
Ninth Amendment as a source of fundamental rights," 64 these documents
are evidence of the political reality that the people retain rights outside of a
written constitution. 65 The failure to claim such rights does not make them
disappear; the difficulty in implementing "such rights, even after they are
proclaimed, does not invalidate them., 66 Rights objectively exist; they flow
COOLEY, supra note 12, at 39; accord Kauper, supra note 11, at 4 (observing
60.
that, because government exists by consent of the people, "one may say that ultimate sovereign power is vested in the people of the United States who ordained and established the
[C]onstitution and who by this document allocated the spheres of au[t]hority between the
central government and the states").
Hilliard, supra note 20, at 98; see also City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters.,
61.
Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976) ("Under our constitutional assumptions, all power derives
from the people, who can delegate it to representative instruments which they create.").
62.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Additionally, Justice
Brewer once stated,
While such declaration of principles may not have the force of organic
law, or be made the basis of judicial decision as to the limits of right and
duty, and while in all cases reference must be had to the organic law of
the nation for such limits, yet the latter is but the body and the letter of
which the former is the thought and the spirit, and it is always safe to
read the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence.
Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 159-60 (1897).
63. U.S. CONST. amend. IX; see also ILL. CONST. art. I, § 24. Similar declarations
are found in many state constitutions. Hilliard, supranote 20, at 99.
64. Hilliard, supra note 20, at 99.
65. Id.at 98- 100; COOLEY, supra note 12, at 49 ("In considering State constitutions
we must not commit the mistake of supposing that, because individual rights are guarded
and protected by them, they must also be considered as owing their origin to them.").
66. FRIEDRICH, supra note 15, at 159.
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existentially from the recognized nature of humanity, as do their corresponding freedoms.67
Not only do the people of a state retain inherent and inalienable rights,
but also, all legitimate authority flows from, and all governmental power
vests in, the people.6 8 All state legislative power ultimately originates in,
and resides with, the people of that state.69 The people's original and inherent legislative power is as full and unlimited as that of the British Parliament; the United States Constitution provides the sole restraint on this otherwise uncontrollable power. 70
This transcendent power remains with the people and is exercised by
the people's representatives in the state legislature. 7' The people delegated
or vested the legislative power "in the most general and unlimited manner
to the several state legislatures, saving only such restrictions as are imposed
by the Constitution of the United States or of the particular state in question., 72 Judge Cooley explained that the people, in creating a state legislature and "conferring upon it the legislative power," must be understood to
have "conferred the full and complete power as it rests in, and may be exercised by, the sovereign power of any country, subject only to such restrictions as [the people] may have seen fit to impose, and [subject] to the limitations" that the Federal Constitution imposes.73 The state legislature is not
a special agency that exercises specifically defined legislative powers, but
67.
Id.at 160.
68.
State ex rel. Creighton Univ. v. Smith, 353 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Neb. 1984) ("Initially, the people have all legislative power.").
69.
McFeeters v. Parker, 30 A.2d 300, 303 (Vt. 1943) ("The people must, of course,
possess all legislative power originally.").
70.
Hawthorn v. Illinois, 109 I11.
302, 305-06 (1883); COOLEY, supra note 12, at
102-03.
71.
Jansky v. Baldwin, 243 P. 302, 303 (Kan. 1926) (observing that "[u]nder our
form of government all governmental power is inherent in the people," who "exercise it
through the legislative branch of government"); Pension Fund v. Schupp, 3 S.W.2d 606, 608
(Ky. 1928); Ludlow-Sayer Wire Co. v. Wollbrinck, 205 S.W. 196, 197 (Mo. 1918); Creighton Univ., 353 N.W.2d at 271; Pope v. Easley, 556 S.E.2d 265, 267 (N.C. 2001); State ex
rel. Johnson v. Baker, 21 N.W.2d 355, 358 (N.D. 1945) ("When the legislature speaks, the
people speak.").
This is the received understanding in Illinois. See KENNEY & BROWN, supra
note 3, at 55 ("Through the General Assembly, the people of the state make the laws by
which they are governed."). For example, the 1970 Illinois Constitution mandates: "The
enacting clause of the laws of this State shall be: 'Be it enacted by the People of the State of
Illinois, represented in the General Assembly."' ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a). This constitutionally-prescribed enacting clause "identifies the people as the ultimate source of law and
the legislature as the agent of the people." SAMUEL K. GOVE ET AL., TfE ILLINOIS
LEGISLATURE: STRUCTURE AND PROCESS 2

(1976); see also Hawthorn, 109 I11.
at 306.

72.
Schupp, 3 S.W.2d at 608-09; McFeeters, 30 A.2d at 303; see Hawthorn, 109 I11.
at 304; Dodd, supra note 50, at 205.
73.
COOLEY, supra note 12, at 104.
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rather is entrusted with the general authority to make laws at its discretion.74
Therefore, as the representative of the sovereign people, a state legislature
does not look to a state constitution for power to act. After all "[t]he people
can make and unmake constitutions. 75 In theory then, a state constitution
need not "grant" power to the state legislature. Rather, all the people need
to do "is to place such limitations as are desired on the legislature's otherwise unlimited power. This is normally done by a bill of rights, which is the
ultimate 'sovereign' people's reservation of governmental power, and by
distributing powers among the three branches of government with accompanying checks and balances. 76 Accordingly, the people restrict and limit
legislative power through the state constitution.77
In other words, the legislative powers that the people did not assign to
the federal government remained with state legislatures, except for those
rights the people withheld for themselves in state constitutions.78 The Tenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution reflects this concept: "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people., 79 The reference to "the people" in the Tenth Amendment strengthens
"the implication that gives value to the Ninth-that there are rights and
powers belonging to the people, beyond those embraced in state or federal
constitutions. These rights, whenever
they can be defined, are not to be
80
infringed by any government.,
Two conclusions emerge from this discussion. First, it is generally understood that the people retain rights or civil liberties subsequent to the
formation of government.8 1 It is fundamental that:
[P]olitical power rests ultimately in the people, that the
popular will is reflected in the constitution and the institutions of representative government designed to serve them.
74. Id; accordGreenfield v. Russel, 127 N.E. 102, 105 (Ill. 1920); Harris v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 105 Ill. 445, 450 (1882).
75.
Hawthorn, 109 Il1.at 302.
76. BRADEN & COHN, supra note 7, at I11.
77.
Harder's Fire Proof Storage & Van Co. v. City of Chicago, 85 N.E. 245, 247-48
(Ill. 1908); Hawthorn, 109 Ill. at 306.
78.
Gautier v. Ditmar, 97 N.E. 464, 467 (N.Y. 1912).
79.
U.S. CONST. amend. X ("[Tiruism that all is retained which has not been surrendered."). The Tenth Amendment merely declared the relationship between the national and
state governments, which was established by the Federal Constitution before the enactment
of the amendment. The purpose of the Tenth Amendment was nothing other "than to allay
fears that the new national government might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that
the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers." United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
80. IRVING BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND MEANING 66 (1965).
81.
COOLEY, supra note 12, at 39, 49.
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[T]he organs of government are subject to the limitaby the people and by the rights retained by
tions 8imposed
2
them.
...

Second, it is historically and uniformly understood that a state legislature
does not turn to the state constitution for power to enact legislation; rather,
the state legislature looks to the state constitution and the Federal Constitution for restrictions upon its power to act.83 Thus, the state legislature may
act in every area of government, subject to the state and Federal Constitutions. 84
C.

GENERAL PURPOSES

Subsequent to the formation of the American Federal Union, "the
United States has constituted the greatest laboratory for constitutional government which the world has ever known.4 5 In addition to appreciating the
historical role of written constitutions, and comprehending the underlying
political theory of state constitutions, Con-Con delegates understood the
general purposes of state constitutions. Generally, a state constitution declares and guarantees the rights and liberties of the people, establishes the
86
framework or structure of government, and institutes fundamental policy.
87
Also, a state constitution provides for its amendment or revision.
1.

Declare/GuaranteeRights

It is a principle deeply rooted in American constitutional experience
liberties are so important as to require recognition in the
individual
that
82.
Kauper, supra note 11, at 6 (alterations in original).
CHARLES A. BEARD, AMERICAN GovERNMENT AND POLITICS 592 (4th ed. 1924).
83.
GARDNER, supra note 57, at 156; see BEARD, supra note 83, at 592; COOLEY,
84.
supra note 12, at 104-06; Dodd, supra note 50, at 208; see also Locust Grove Cemetery
Ass'n v. Rose, 156 N.E.2d 577, 580 (Ill. 1959); Greenfield v. Russel, 127 N.E. 102, 105 (Il.
1920); Harder's Fire Proof Storage & Van Co. v. City of Chicago, 85 N.E. 245, 248 (Ill.
1908); Illinois ex rel. Woodyatt v. Thompson, 40 N.E. 307, 312 (Ill. 1895); Oakland County
Taxpayers' League v. Bd. of Supervisors of Oakland County, 94 N.W.2d 875, 885 (Mich.
1959); Ohio ex rel. Jackman v. Ct. Com. Pl. of Cuyahoga County, 224 N.E.2d 906, 909
(Ohio 1967); Wisconsin ex rel. McCormack v. Foley, 118 N.W.2d 211,213 (Wis. 1962).
85.
Walker, supra note 46, at 10.
86.
See id at 11-12; David Fellman, What Should A State Constitution Contain?, in
MAJOR PROBLEMS IN STATE CONSTITUTrONAL REviSION 139 (W. Brooke Graves ed., 1967);
Samuel W. Witwer, The Shape of the Illinois Constitution, 17 DEPAUL L. REV. 467, 467
(1968); accord BEARD, supra note 83, at 491; G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE
CoNsTrrunoN s 11-23 (1998).
BEARD, supra note 83, at 491; Kauper, supra note 11, at 10; Hilliard, supra note
87.
1, at 495.
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fundamental law. 88 The bills of rights of American state constitutions are
testaments to the high regard in which both constitution-drafters and the
people view individual liberties. State bills of rights also indicate the realization that individual liberties must be protected from the arbitrary exercise
of government authority. 89 Indeed, each of "the fifty state constitutions includes a bill of rights or a declaration of rights. In every instance, the bill of
rights is placed in one of the first articles of the constitution, an indication
of the great importance which has been attributed to it throughout state constitutional history." 90
We know from our experience-just as the framers of the Federal
Constitution knew from theirs-that government may become arbitrary
and, at times, even oppressive; that minorities may sometimes need protection against the tyranny of the majority; that the dissenter, the government
critic, and the social theorist all need to be protected against the power of
government and the imposition of any official or orthodox view of government. We know that a democratic society requires constant re-examination
and constructive criticism for its sound growth and development. Further,
the people, in their ordinary pursuits, must be protected against bureaucratic
and administrative excesses, whether such excesses result from overzealousness or negligence, and whether conducted in the name of the public
interest or based on other motives. 9 1 Additionally, as has been explained, a
state legislature may act in every area of government subject to constitutional limitations. 92 Thus, the inclusion of certain individual rights and liberties in a state bill of rights places them beyond the reach of state government. 93 Such rights and liberties are elevated to the highest level on the
hierarchy of a state's laws. 94
One may ask if a state bill of rights is necessary in light of the Federal
Bill of Rights. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution already protects many individual rights from state impairment. 95 Rati88.
89.

Kauper, supra note 11, at 15.

Id.; Robert S. Rankin, The Bill of Rights, in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN STATE

CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 159

(W. Brooke Graves ed., 1967).

Frank P. Grad, The State Bill of Rights, in CON-CON: ISSUES FOR THE ILLINOIS
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 30 (Samuel K. Gove et al. eds., 1970); accord Rankin, supra
90.

note 89, at 159 ("Unlike the Federal Constitution where the bill of rights is found as amendments, bills of rights in state constitutions constitute the first article-a position that attests
to the importance and basic character of the subject matter.").
91.
Grad, supra note 90, at 30. Accordingly, "in contrast with federal practice,
states have not treated their bills of rights as sacrosanct but have amended them with some
frequency." TARR, supra note 86, at 13.
92.
See supra notes 50-71 and accompanying text.
Grad, supra note 90, at 31.
93.
Id; Rankin, supra note 89, at 163.
94.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
95.
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fled in 1865, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees, among other things,
that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law." 96 By interpreting the concept of "liberty," the United
States Supreme Court has made most of the Federal Bill of Rights applicable against state government. 97 Thus, many state bills of rights
98 duplicate
many of the important provisions of the Federal Bill of Rights.
"Undoubtedly the Fourteenth Amendment is a bulwark of protection
against arbitrary state action but it has not removed the need for bills of
rights in state constitutions." 99 First, the federal rights that have been applied against state governments do not embrace all of the rights that state
bills of rights recognize and protect.' 00 Also, a state may protect a certain
right or liberty to a far-greater extent than is afforded under the Federal
Constitution. 10' Additionally, state governments exercise powers that affect
the people more closely than that exercised by the federal government.'0 2
Thus, when a state government abridges a person's rights, that person
should be able to seek protection in0 3his or her own state courts, invoking
that person's own state constitution.'
The provisions contained in state bills of rights may be grouped in
three general categories.' °4 First, most state bills of rights contain introductory statements of the underlying political theory of the rights declared or
recognized therein. 0 5 For example, article I, section 1 of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution declares: "All men are by nature free and independent and
have certain inherent and inalienable rights among which are life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness. To secure these rights and the protection of
property, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed.' 0 6 Also found in these introductory
statements are references to the rule of law and other broad principles of
democratic government.10 7 At the time of Con-Con, the bills of rights of all
Id.
96.
97.
Grad, supra note 90, at 32.
Id.; Kauper, supra note 11, at 15; Rankin, supra note 89, at 163.
98.
99.
Rankin, supra note 89, at 164; accordGrad, supra note 90, at 33 ("[Tlhere is a
clear, continuing justification for state bills of rights.").
100.
Kauper, supra note 11, at 15.
Grad, supra note 90, at 33 ("The [F]ederal Bill of Rights as applied through the
101.
Fourteenth Amendment merely establishes the minimum amount of protection afforded,
leaving the states free to impose more stringent requirements if they choose to do so.");
accordKauper, supra note 11, at 15; TARR, supra note 86, at 12-13.
102.
Grad, supra note 90, at 33.
Id.
103.
104.
Rankin, supra note 89, at 160.
105.
Id.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
106.
BEARD, supra note 83, at 494-95; Rankin, supra note 89, at 160.
107.
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fifty states contained a provision similar to the Ninth Amendment to the
United States Constitution declaring that the enumeration of certain rights
are not all of the rights that the people retain. 0 8 Further, the bills of rights
of forty-seven states contained a provision similar to the Tenth Amendment, declaring that the people retain political power. 109
The second general category of state bills of rights provisions are those
"designed to protect personal and property rights."' 10 These guarantees include substantive rights-such as freedom of religion, speech, press, assembly, and petition-as well as procedural rights that secure equality before the law and a fair trial-such as the requirements of indictment by
grand jury and trial by jury, as well as the prohibitions against unreasonable
searches and seizures, excessive bail, and cruel and unusual punishment."'
Property rights are protected by declarations that private property cannot be
taken for public use without just compensation. 1 2 Third, state bills of rights
contain "provisions that defy classification and must be lumped together in
a miscellaneous group. Some are essential to the preservation of liberty;
others are not."' " 3 Therefore, "there is no debate over the inclusion of a bill
of rights in a state constitution. Debate occurs only over the subject matter."' 14
2.

Establish GovernmentFramework/Structure

Also, it is standard practice for a state constitution to establish the
principal organs of government and to distribute the powers of government
among them." 5 According to the common pattern, a state constitution usually addresses the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of state government, describing their structure, powers, and limitations. " 6 In addition to
the familiar establishment and description of the three general branches of
government, it is appropriate to specifically recognize two additional organs
of government within an American state-the electorate and local government. " 7

108.
Rankin, supra note 89, at 162.
Id.
109.
110.
Id. at 160.
See id.
111.
112.
BEARD, supranote 83, at 491-94; Rankin, supra note 89, at 161.
113.
For example, "lobbying is not permitted," and "immigration should be encouraged." Rankin, supra note 89, at 161-62.
114.
Id.at 175.
115.
Walker, supra note 46, at 11.
116.
BEARD, supra note 83, at 495; Fellman, supra note 86, at 139; TARR, supra note
86, at 15-19.
Fellman, supra note 86, at 139.
117.
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The principle of separation of powers, with its checks and balances, is
a classic, even fundamental, part of American constitutional theory."18 The
doctrine is a reaction to the parliamentary form of government under which
colonial legislatures operated. 119 Colonial legislatures were courts of last
resort, hearing original actions or appeals from judicial judgments. 20 Often,
these legislatures simply set aside judicial decisions and ordered new trials
or appeals.' 2 1 Further, during the Revolutionary Era, the increasingly radical populism of legislatures increased the frequency of legislative overturning of judicial judgments. 122 The doctrine of separation of powers, with its
system of checks and balances, evolved from the philosophy that unchecked power, whether wielded by a monarch or "the people," results in
injustice and brutality, and threatens life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi123
ness.
According to the doctrine of separation of powers, the powers of government can be categorized into three types: legislative, executive, and judicial. 124 The distribution of power under this theory, with a system of
checks and balances, inhibits any single branch of government from unduly
extending its power.125 These three governmental powers are committed to
their respective branches, and no branch "shall exercise powers committed
to the other two" branches. 26 The legislative branch enacts laws. 127 The
executive branch, however, can veto legislation and the judicial branch can
declare legislation unconstitutional. 128 The executive branch executes laws
and the judicial branch interprets laws. 129 Nevertheless, the legislative
branch can limit the budget of those branches; enact laws restricting their
authority in certain areas, within constitutional limitations; confirm many of
their officers, and, when warranted, impeach their officers for illegal actions. 3 0
The principle of separation of powers remains generally valid. 131 It is
not the function of the executive branch of government to enact legislation,
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

123.

supra note 83, at 33; Kauper, supra note 11, at 8.
See BEARD, supranote 83, at 33.
Plaut v. Spendthift Farms, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,219 (1995).
Id.
Id. at 219-21.
BEARD,

BEARD,

supra note 83, at 34.

124.
Kauper, supra note 11, at 8.
125.
Id.
126.
Id.; see also Plaut, 514 U.S. at 221-25 (discussing the separation of legislative
power from judicial power).
127.
See U.S. CONST. art. I.
128.
Kauper, supra note 11, at 13-14.
129.
See COOLEY, supra note 12, at 46.
130.
See BEARD, supra note 83, at 34; COOLEY, supra note 12, at 46.
131.
Kauper, supra note 11, at 8.
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nor is it the function of the legislative branch to conduct trials of persons
accused of crime.' 32 Despite the general validity of the doctrine, a rigid
separation of powers is obviously not possible.' 33 For example, administrative agencies within the executive branch of government often exercise all
three government powers. 34 Thus, "any theory of complete separation of
powers is untenable and unworkable.' ' 135 Nonetheless, state constitutions
commonly include a provision establishing a categorically-worded separation of powers. 136 At the time of Con-Con, approximately thirty state constitutions explicitly established the principle of separation of powers;' 37 however, "[s]eparation of powers with checks and balances obtains ' in
all the
38
other states, of course, even without a specific provision therefor."'
The electorate appropriately constitutes an organ of government within
a state. "The right to vote gives the people a regular and recognized influence in the determination of public affairs.' 39 Indeed, voters in a state "are
the primary organ of power, both because they in the end establish the constitution and because they elect the legislative representatives and other
officers who operate the government.' 140 However, "[s]tates have long been
held to have broad powers to determine the conditions under which the
right of suffrage may be exercised ... absent of course the discrimination
which the Constitution condemns."' 14 1 Of course, the Federal Constitution
imposes several limitations on states regarding voting. A state may not disenfranchise anyone "on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude"; 4 2 or "on account of sex"; 14 3 or "by reason of failure to pay any
poll tax or other tax";144or on account of age, if the voter is at least eighteen
years old. 145 Further, the Federal Constitution grants Congress the power to
132.
See id.
133.
See id.
134.
See id.
135.
See id.The three branches are part of a single operating government; the doctrine of separation of powers was not designed to achieve a complete divorce between them.
People v. Reiner, 129 N.E.2d 159, 162 (Ill. 1955).
136.
Kauper, supra note 11, at 8; see GARDNER, supra note 57, at 170-71.
137.
See BRADEN & COHN, supra note 7, at 109.
138.
See id.

139.

William Goodman, Suffrage, in CON-CON: ISSUES
(Samuel K. Gove et al. eds., 1970).

CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 83

FOR

THE

ILLINOIS

140.
Kauper, supra note 11, at 12; see also COOLEY, supra note 12, at 748 ("The
authority of the people is exercised through elections, by means of which they choose legislative, executive, and judicial officers, to whom are to be entrusted the exercise of powers of
government.").
141.
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959).
142.
U.S. CONST.amend. XV.
143.
Id.amend. XIX.
144.
Id. amend. XXIV.
145.
Id.amend. XXVI.
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make regulations, or alter existing state regulations, regarding the time,
place, and manner of holding elections for members of Congress. 46 Also,
federal law, enforcing the Fourteenth 1and
47 Fifteenth Amendments, prohibits
the discriminatory use of literacy tests.
Absent these federal limitations, "the States have the power to impose
reasonable citizenship, age, and residency requirements on the availability
of the ballot." 148 This conclusion is based on the orthodox reasoning that the
Federal Constitution, including its amendments, establishing and regulating
a government of limited and enumerated powers, does not bestow the right
to vote. In other words, "the privilege to vote in a state is within the jurisdiction of the state itself, to be exercised as the state may direct, and upon
such terms as to it may seem proper, provided, of course, no discrimination
149
is made between individuals in violation of the Federal Constitution.''
Illinois courts have long recognized that the right to vote is not an inalienable or absolute right. 150 Rather, voting is a conditional right. The state legislature has the power to prescribe reasonable conditions on the right to
vote, such as residency and registration requirements, polling place regulation, and voting methodology.151
Based on the historic power of state government to regulate access to
the ballot, it should be desirable, if not crucial, to memorialize principles,
guidance, and limitations in the state constitution. "The suffrage article of a
[state] constitution should do two things: it should provide for the qualifications for being allowed to vote and it should guarantee that those who have
such qualifications can vote."' 52 At the time of Con-Con, the requirement of
residency in the state, county, or election district prior to the election varied

Id. art. I, § 4.
147. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975, 2000 (2004); Voting
Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 (2004).
146.

148.
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 625 (1969); accordCarrington
v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965) (recognizing that states possess "unquestioned power to
impose reasonable residence restrictions of the availability of the ballot. There can be no
doubt either of the historic function of the States to establish, on a nondiscriminatory basis,
and in accordance with the Constitution, other qualifications for the exercise of the fIanchise" (citation omitted)).
149.
Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1903), overruled on other grounds by
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); see also Griffin v. Roupas, 385 F.3d 1128, 1130
(7th Cir. 2004) ("The Constitution does not in so many words confer a right to vote, though
it has been held to do so implicitly. Rather, it confers on the states broad authority to regulate the conduct of elections .... (citations omitted)).
150.
See, e.g., Tuthill v. Rendleman, 56 N.E.2d 375, 390 (Ill. 1944).
151.
See Scribner v. Sachs, 164 N.E.2d 481, 490 (I11.
1960); Clark v. Quick, 36
N.E.2d 563, 565 (111. 1941); Goodman, supra note 139, at 83-86.
152.
BRADEN & COHN,supra note 7, at 388.
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among the states, ranging from a few years
down to ten days, with the trend
53
towards shortening such requirements.
A local government constitutes an additional organ of government
within a state. In American law, states create and regulate local governments, e.g., cities, villages, townships, and special districts. The state constitution and statutes determine the existence, form of government, function, and powers of local government. 54 Generally, courts consider local
governments to possess only those powers that the state expressly and specifically confers upon them, and those powers that are clearly implied in the
155
powers expressly granted; this principle is known as "Dillon's Rule."'
Courts construe Dillon's Rule narrowly; a court should resolve any doubt as
to the power of a56local government against the local government and in
1
favor of the state.
As an initial response to these restrictions on local government, state
legislatures developed special charters for particular municipal corporations; however, the flexibility of the special-charter approach had several
drawbacks to the detriment of municipal self-government, such as overlapping districts that caused complexity and confusion in providing government services.' 57 Eventually the demand developed for the inclusion of
home rule provisions in state constitutions. 58 "Home rule" refers to a constitutional allocation of local powers to local government, in an attempt to
distinguish matters primarily of statewide concern from matters of local
concern. 5 9 Beginning with Missouri in 1875, by 1970, approximately
160
thirty-five states guaranteed municipal home rule in various forms.
Almost all state constitutions include an article dealing, in one way or
another, with
local
government.
A state
constitution
article on local
local government
should
seek
a constitutional
balance
that guarantees
self153.

154.

Id. at 386-87.

See Arthur W. Bromage, Local Government, in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN STATE

CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 240 (W. Brooke Graves ed., 1967); Alice L. Ebel, Local Government Outside of Cook County, in CON-CON: ISSUES FOR THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 204 (Samuel K. Gove et al. eds., 1970); Joseph F. Small, Urban Government,
in CON-CON: ISSUES FOR THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 228 (Samuel K. Gove
et al. eds., 1970).
155.
See Stein v. County Bd. of Sch. Trs. of Du Page County, 240 N.E.2d 668, 669
(I11.
1968); TARR, supra note 86, at 19. For a thorough discussion of Dillon's Rule, see 2A
EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 10.09-10.12.50 (3d ed.
1996).
156.
Ebel, supra note 154, at 204-05; Small, supra note 154, at 230; see also
MCQUILLIN, supranote 155, §§ 10.18.10-10.24.
157.
Bromage, supra note 154, at 241; Small, supra note 154, at 230-32.
158.
Bromage, supra note 154, at 242; Ebel, supra note 154, at 218.
159.
Ebel, supra note 154, at 218; see MCQUILLIN, supra note 155, §§ 10.13-10.16.
160.
Bromage, supra note 154, at 242-43; Small, supra note 154, at 235-37.
161.
Ebel, supra note 154, at 213.
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determination in all matters of purely local concern and that also guarantees
162
state legislative jurisdiction in matters of common statewide interest.
More specifically, scholars have suggested three basic requirements. A state
constitution article on local government should (1) promote local selfgovernment by providing for a broad and unambiguous grant of power to
local governments that will stimulate initiative and vigor in addressing new
and expanding responsibilities; (2) permit maximum intergovernmental
handling; and (3) liberate the state legislature from the burden of acting on
a multitude of local bills,
so that it may concentrate on matters of impor163
tance to the entire state.
3.

Institute FundamentalPolicy

Also, most state constitutions include "articles of varying length and
detail on a wide variety of additional subjects," such as education, revenue,
and finance.' 64 As earlier explained, the state legislature does not require
authorization to address these and all other areas within constitutional limitations. By the time of Con-Con, however, "documents reflect[ed] the
modern interest in new social services by authorizing or even directing legislative activity in regard to welfare and health activities, care of the aged,
166
social security, unemployment, workmen's compensation, and the like."'
4.

Provide Means of ConstitutionalChange

"State constitutions will change, although not so rapidly as many
might desire or to so great a degree and in such fashion as others might like.
Yet change there will be. In a dynamic society, time and circumstances will
inevitably work their imperfect will on a state's fundamental law."' 167 As
with a garment, a state constitution can be changed in three basic ways.
First, the people can cut out and discard a portion of the document that no
longer fits and, if necessary, replace it with a better-fitting piece. Second,
the people can create an entirely new document out of whole cloth. Third,
the judicial branch of state government, by interpreting a state constitution,
can apply a patch to a specific area in the document where it is worn out.
As the establishment of a state constitution rests ultimately on the
authority and will of the people, an expression of the same popular will
162.
Small, supra note 154, at 244.
163.
Ebel, supra note 154, at 225; see TARR, supranote 86, at 20-23.
164.
BEARD, supra note 83, at 495-96; Fellman, supra note 86, at 139.
165.
See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
166.
Fellman, supra note 86, at 139.
167.
Ernest R. Bartley, Methods of Constitutional Change, in MAJOR PROBLEMS IN
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 22 (W. Brooke Graves ed., 1967).
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should always be able to change a state constitution. A state constitution
should allow opportunity for future amendment or revision and voter ratification thereof. The charter should describe the procedures for such amendment or revision. The process of constitutional change should not be too
easy or too difficult. The process must not only preserve the constitution's
role as the state's basic and fundamental law, but the process must also provide adequate channels for change. 168 The two formal means of constitutional change are by amendment or revision. There is a "tendency to attempt piecemeal patching of a state's fundamental law by amendment
rather than to undertake the more69 onerous, though often obviously necessary, path of full-scale revision." 1
Almost universally, a constitutional amendment must somehow be initiated, which voters must ultimately ratify. States employ three methods of
initiating constitutional amendments. 70 First, the legislature can initiate
constitutional amendments. Second, in some states, the people can directly
initiate amendments through the use of initiative petitions. Third, "[t]hough
it is customary to think of a state constitutional convention primarily as an
instrument for drafting an entirely new constitution or overhauling an old
one, the convention is also used for the purpose of initiating amendments to
it is
an existing document."' 17 1 No matter how the amendment is initiated,
72
almost universal that voters must ratify the proposed amendment.
Constitutional defects can be cured by amendment, but if the necessary
changes in a state constitution are too long delayed or cannot be accomplished by amendment or interpretation, then the document must be thoroughly revised or overhauled. 73 The most generally used means of constitutional revision-the only means common to all fifty states-is the constitutional convention.1 74 The convention method consists of the people's
election of delegates for the specific purpose of constitutional revision. The
convention method connotes an approval and a dignity absent in other
methods. Historically and legally, a constitutional convention is the direct
voice of the people in matters pertaining to the revision. Indeed, even in
states where constitutions do not expressly provide for calling conventions,
the rule is that the right to hold constitutional conventions is inherent in the
168.
169.
170.
3

BEARD, supra note 83, at 496; Kauper, supra note 11, at 18.

Bartley, supranote 167, at 24.
Id.at 25; see also Gerald Benjamin, ConstitutionalAmendment andRevision, in

STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TwENTY-FIRST

CENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 181-92 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006).

171.

Bartley, supra note 167, at 25; accord Robert W. Bergstrom, The Amending

Process, in CON-CON: ISSUES FOR THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 465 (Samuel

K. Gove et al. eds., 1970).
172.
Bartley, supranote 167, at 27-28; Bergstrom, supra note 171, at 470-71.
173.
Bartley, supranote 167, at 28.
174.
Id. at 32.
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people.175 The product of the convention, a proposed state constitution, is
then normally submitted to voters for ratification. In sum, a state constitution evolves as a society evolves. The extent of constitutional change is the
product of societal pressures. 176
The third method of constitutional change is by judicial interpretation.1 77 The doctrine of judicial review can be simply stated. A constitution
vests "the judicial power" in the judicial branch of a government. The judicial power includes the power to explain and interpret the law. 178 Accordingly, it is the specific province and duty of the judiciary to expound the
law. A constitution is the fundamental and highest "law"; therefore, the
judicial branch of government is the final arbiter of what the constitution
means. 179 Of course, members of the legislative and executive branches of
government swear to uphold the constitution. In performing assigned constitutional functions, each branch must initially interpret the constitution,
and the other branches must respect that interpretation; however, the final
responsibility of interpreting the constitution rests with the judicial branch,
because it is the province and duty of the courts to declare the law. 180 Indeed, the principle that the judiciary is the final expositor of a constitution
"a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional sysis deemed
181
tem."
State judiciaries have generally construed state constitutions strictly,
stifling state constitutional change. Further, the detailed language of most
state constitutions leaves little room for constitutional change by interpretation, and provides a judicial rationalization for strict constitutional construcclause, or even a section can
tion; however, a particular word, phrase,
182
change through judicial interpretation.
This article has discussed the history, theory, and purposes of state
constitutions in American constitutional law and the American political
system in general. Now, it is time to narrow the focus to Illinois. This arti175.
Id.
Bartley, supra note 167, at 22, 35-36.
176.
177. Id.at 22-24.
178.
E.g., Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 860 N.E.2d 246, 255 (Ill. 2006);
Shields v. Judges' Ret. Sys. of Ill., 791 N.E.2d 516, 521 (Ill. 2003).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176-77 (1803); Hailer Sign Works v. Physical
179.
Culture Training Sch., 94 N.E. 920, 922 (Ill. 1911); Richardson v. Hare, 160 N.W.2d 883,
885 (Mich. 1968) (quoting Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley's Lessee, 27 U.S. 492, 524 (1829));
Stilp v. Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 918, 948 (Pa. 2006) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)).
180.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974); John F. Jelke Co. v. Emery,
214 N.W. 369, 373 (Wis. 1927).
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); accord People ex rel Bruce v. Dunne,
181.
101 N.E. 560, 564 (Ill. 1913).
182.
Bartley, supra note 167, at 22-24.
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cle will next recount the background, framing, and ratification of the 1970
Illinois Constitution.
III.

BACKGROUND OF 1970 ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION

Although the 1970 Illinois Constitution "is progressively designed to
meet the needs of the 20th and 21st centuries, it is a stable and permanent
document, deeply rooted in Illinois history."' 3
A.

PREDECESSOR CONSTITUTIONS

Illinois has had four constitutions since achieving statehood.18 4 Scholars have described Illinois constitutional history as repeated episodes where
the people create a constitution that imposes limitations on state government, which subsequently constitutes a straightjacket from which the people struggle to free themselves by way of a new constitution.' 85 The 1818
18 6
Constitution was written hurriedly with the goal of attaining statehood.
The 1848 and 1870 Constitutions "created new problems while trying to
resolve earlier ones."' 8 7 In 1969, Con-Con "overhauled the law of the land
and engineered a political alliance to gain voter support. It was a major
achievement in Illinois history and one of the best examples of the state's
occasional
ability to overcome its individualism to address a common prob188
lem."'
1.

1818 Constitution

The first constitution "was a requirement for statehood and its creation
was rushed because Illinois hoped to become a state before its neighbor,
Missouri.' ', 89 At the request of the territorial legislature, Congress authorized the election of thirty-three delegates to a convention to form a state
constitution and government. 90 At that time, it was not clear whether Illinois would enter the Union as a free state or a slave state. For several years
prior to 1818, the majority of the population of the Illinois Territory came
183.
Samuel W. Witwer, Introduction to the 1970 Illinois Constitution,in ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. at XXV (West 2006).
184.
ILL. CONST.; ILL. CONST. of 1870; ILL. CONST. of 1848; ILL. CONST. of 1818.
185.
SAMUEL K. GoVE & JAMES D. NOWLAN, ILLINOIS POLITICS & GOVERNMENT: THE
EXPANDING METROPOLITAN FRONTIER 65 (1996).
186.
Id. at 67; Witwer, supra note 183, at XXV.
187.
GOVE&NOwLAN, supra note 185, at 65.
188.
Id. at 65-66.
189.
Id. at 67; see CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 3-6.
190.
3 Stat. 428 (1818); see ILL. ANN. STAT., Organic Acts-Illinois, at 350 (SmithHurd 1971); Witwer, supra note 183, at XXV.
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from southern states, bringing their customs and traditions with them. Indeed, at least two-thirds of the population either came from, or were in
families with roots in, the South. 191 Further, during this time, the territory
had been receiving a significant number of settlers who were unequivocally
against slavery or any compromise on the issue.' 92 Thus, at one extreme,
some Illinoisans favored unrestricted slavery in the new state. At the other
extreme, some would have completely eradicated every vestige of the institution.193 Most of the politicians and voters occupied a middle ground between the two extremes. This middle majority "had no particular desire to
extend the power of slavery, but who felt that its strict prohibition would
for the most part, they found the indenture law
seriously hamper settlement; 194
a comfortable compromise."'
Voters (white males) elected delegates to the 1818 Constitutional Convention to frame a constitution for the proposed state. 195 Because of the
wide range of opinion on the subject of slavery generally, that portion of the
constitution which dealt with slavery received the most attention. 196 Scholars have separated convention delegates into three groups: slavery proponents, abolitionists, and "compromisists," who were those who preferred to
at the same time giving to the
maintain the existing indenture system, while
97
constitution.
free
a
of
appearance
the
state
The First Illinois Constitutional Convention drafted, debated, and
adopted a proposed constitution in three weeks.' 9 8 What resulted from the
convention on the issue of slavery was article VI of the Illinois Constitution
of 1818.199 Article VI prohibited formal slavery, but recognized existing
indentures. Blacks might still be bound, but only while in a condition of
"perfect freedom," and on condition that they received or were promised to
receive a bona fide consideration, and that the indenture did not extend
191.

Solon Buck, Illinois in 1818, in Introductory Volume, THE CENTENNIAL

HISTORY OF ILLINOIS 95-96 (I11. Centennial Comrn'n 1920); JAMES E. DAVIS, FRONTIER
ILLINOIS 159-60 (1998); N. DWIGHT HARIS, THE HISTORY OF NEGRO SERVITUDE IN ILLINOIS
AND OF THE SLAVERY AGITATION IN THAT STATE 1719-1864, at 16-17 (Negro Univ. Press

1969) (1904).
192.
DAVIS, supra note 191, at 159; Clarence Alvord, The Illinois Country, 1673Centennial Comm'n 1920).
1818, at 461, in 1 THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF ILLINOIS (I11.
193.
Alvord, supra note 192, at 461.
194.
See id.
195.
See supra note 190.
Alvord, supra note 192, at 462; Mason Fishback, Illinois Legislation on Slavery
196.
andFree Negroes, 9 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ILLINOIS STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY 416 (1904);
see DAVIS, supra note 191, at 165 ("Slavery heated races for delegates to the constitutional
convention.").
HARRIS, supra note 191, at 21.
197.
198.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 10-11, 18; GOvE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 65.
ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VI.
199.
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longer than one year. 200 Blacks who were indentured under the former territorial law would be held to the specific performance of their indentures;
however, their children would become free, males at age twenty-one and
females at age eighteen. 20 1 Further, no indentures made outside of the state
could be enforced in the state. 202 Notably, the constitution did not forbid a
subsequent amendment to allow formal slavery.20 3 After the convention
adopted the proposed constitution, the charter did not go to the voters for
ratification, but rather, was submitted to Congress for its approval. 1°4 The
congressional debates revealed that slavery was the only real issue.20 5 On
December 3, 1818, President James Monroe signed
the congressional reso20 6
lution thereby admitting Illinois into the Union.
The slavery article in the 1818 Illinois Constitution is not easy to interpret. Some scholars believe that the slavery article "probably means simply that the people of the state were not ready to take a definite stand on the
question., 20 7 Other scholars believe that the convention intended "to make
Illinois ultimately a free state and to wipe out the territorial indenture system for the future, but to interfere in no way with existing property rights in
slaves or indentured servants. 20 8 Most scholars, however, view article VI
as a victory for the compromisists.
This compromise garnered votes from proslavery delegates, who knew not to push slavery too stridently, while it
avoided antagonizing moderate and antislavery congressmen. Perhaps it was the best deal proslavery forces could
get in 1818. It glossed over sensitive matters and left much
unaddressed, postponing decisive battles. Although it assured current slave owners, it mortally wounded slavery
masked as indentured servitude, heralded slavery's eventual death, and ratified true indentured servants. Slaves
working as indentured servants reflected a beleaguered in200.
201.
202.

Id.§ 1.
Id.§3.

ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VI; see PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION:
SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, & COMITY 96 (1981).
203.
ILL. CONST. of 1818, arts. VI, VII.
204.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 18-19; SAMUEL K. GOVE & THOMAS R. KiTsos,

REVISION SUCCESS: THE SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 2 (1974); Witwer,

supra note 183, at XXV.
205.
Buck, supra note 191, at 312-16; Fishback, supra note 196, at 417; HARRIS,
supra note 191, at 25.
206.
3 Stat. 536 (1818). See ILL. ANN. STAT., Organic Acts-Illinois, at 356 (SmithHurd 1971).
207.
Alvord, supra note 192, at 463.
208.
Buck, supra note 191, at 282.
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stitution. The compromise certainly eased statehood for Illinois. 0 9
Illinois was admitted into the Union, "and the right
to retain negroes as 'in210
dentured servants' was recognized and secured.,
The 1818 Constitution provided for a bicameral legislature, and the
separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches
of government. 211 The governor was allowed only one consecutive fouryear term, no exclusive veto power, and limited power of appointment. The
constitution vested the power to appoint non-elected state officers in the
legislature.21 2 The veto power was limited to the validity of legislation, and
could be exercised only by the governor and supreme court jointly.2 13
2.

1848 Constitution

By 1842, the shortcomings of the 1818 Constitution had become apparent: "The excessive power of the legislature, the weakness of the executive, squabbles between the two branches over appointments, an inadequate
judiciary, life appointments for some officials[,] and the question of alien
suffrage were some of the main faults cited as reasons for revision., 2 14 The
legislature was often clumsy in wielding its excessive power, and had even
greater difficulty in working within the 1818 Constitution's highly restrictive banking provisions.2 15 As the state's economy grew, this situation led
to a series of financial debacles. 2 16 "The disastrous condition of government
was seen by the state's leaders as due not to inexperience, public apathy, or
determination by individuals to enrich themselves at the public's expense,
209.
210.

DAVIS, supra note 191, at 165.
John Hand, Negro Slavery in Illinois, in 15 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ILLINOIS
STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY 43 (1910); HARRIS, supra note 191, at 26.
211.
ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VI, § 1 (separation of powers), art. II, § 1 (bicameral
legislature).
212.
See ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. III.
213.
ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. III, §§ 19, 22; see CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 11-18;
GOVE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 67; Witwer, supranote 183, at XXV.
214.
GOVE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 3; see also GOVE & NOWLAN, supra note
185, at 68 ("The first constitution gave the legislature so much power and the governor so
little power that the system was ripe for abuse.").
215.
The 1818 Constitution declared: "That there shall be no other banks or moneyed
institutions in this state than those already provided by law, except a state bank and its
branches, which may be established and regulated by the general assembly of the state as
they may think proper." ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 21.
216.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 27; GOVE & NOwLAN, supra note 185, at 68; see
also Witwer, supra note 183, at XXVI ("[T]he State was in a perilous economic position
because of ill-considered financial programs. State Banks failed twice, at considerable financial loss to the State. An expensive State railroad construction program collapsed.").
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but rather to defects in the constitution, which could be corrected by the
writing of a new document." 21 7 Another impetus for constitutional change
was the people's demand for more direct control of government through the
direct popular election of state officials, based on the outgrowth of Jacksonian democracy.21
In 1842, a convention call failed. "Although the [call] received a majority vote of those voting [for] it, [the call] did not meet the [restrictive]
constitutional standard of a majority of those voting for representatives" in
the state legislature. 219 During the next four years, newspaper editors united
to condemn the 1818 Constitution and to inform the public of the necessity
for constitutional change. As a result of this aggressive campaign, at the
1846 general election, the constitutional call was approved by the required
constitutional majority. 220 "The delegates were elected [in] the following
year ... and the [Second Illinois Constitutional Convention] convened in
June 1847. ' '221

The 1848 Constitution was longer and more detailed than the 1818
Constitution. Also, several issues in the 1848 charter were the result of political compromise because no political party could achieve all of its
goals.222 The drafters of the 1848 Constitution "made a major effort to correct the mistakes of the 1818 Constitution. Their degree of success is questionable as many provisions quickly became obsolete. 223 Indeed, "[t]he
second convention provided more lessons in the difficulty of writing a good
constitution. Delegates seeking to correct mistakes in the first document
inserted restrictive language in the second, effectively tying the hands of
future Illinoisans. 224 For example, a strict state debt limit was imposed,
and no state bank could thereafter be created.225 Further, the governor was
given sole veto power, and judges were to be elected, rather than appointed
by the Illinois General Assembly. Also, "[t]he 1848 Constitution provided a
difficult alternative amending process, permitting proposals by the General
Assembly., 226 There was only minor opposition from any group to the ratiCORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 28.
217.
Id. at 27; accordGOVE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 3.
218.
219.
Witwer, supra note 183, at XXVI; see also CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 28;
GovE & Krrsos, supranote 204, at 3; GovE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 68.
220.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 29; GoVE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 3; GOVE &

NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 68-69.
221.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 29-31; GOVE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 3.

GOVE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 3.
222.
Id.
223.
224.
GOVE & NowLAN, supranote 185, at 69.
ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. HI, § 37 (debt), art X, § 3 (no state bank).
225.
Witwer, supra note 183, at XXVI; see CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 32-42; Wit226.
wer, supra note 183, at XX; see also ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. IV, § 21 (veto), art. V (election ofjudges), art. XII (amendment).
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fication of the proposed constitution. In March 1848, the voters ratified the
new constitution, which took effect April 1, 1848.227
The 1848 Illinois Constitution shows that while most Illinoisans were
against slavery, "they were far from being abolitionists. 228 The 1848 Constitution abolished the indenture system by simply omitting it. However,
article XIV of the constitution also provided:
The [G]eneral [A]ssembly shall, at its first session under
the amended constitution, pass such laws as will effectually
prohibit free persons of color from immigrating to and settling in this state; and to effectually prevent the owners of
slaves from bringing them into this state for the purpose of
setting them free.229
The framers of the 1848 Constitution feared that opposition to the antiimmigration article would jeopardize the constitution's ratification. 230 The
article was opposed in northern Illinois, especially in Cook County. 23 As a
result, the article was submitted to the voters separate from the remainder of
the constitution. The constitution was adopted by a margin of approximately 44,000 votes, while the anti-immigration
article was adopted by a
232
margin of approximately 28,200 votes.

"Concern for further constitutional change came almost immediately
after the approval of the 1848 Constitution., 233 The problem was that "[s]o
many details were included [in the 1848 Constitution], to correct past
abuses, that . . . it soon became inadequate., 234 In 1856, only eight years
after the people ratified the "new" constitution, a call for a constitutional
convention was submitted to the voters, who decisively voted in the negative.235 The defeat was partly due to limited voter awareness of the issues.2 36
Also, "voting was mainly along sectional lines, with
[only] the northern
237
[section] of the state strongly in support of the call.,
In 1860, the people successfully called for a constitutional convention.
"Newspapers which in 1856 had hardly mentioned the convention call gave
227.

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
supranote
236.
237.

GovE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 3; see CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 43-44.

Fishback, supra note 196, at 426.
ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. X1V.
Fishback, supra note 196, at 427.
Id.
Id.
GovE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 70.
Witwer, supra note 183, at XXVI.
1855 Il1.Laws. 743 (submitting convention call to voters); see also CORNELIUS,
7, at 45-46.
GovE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 70.
GovE & Krrsos, supra note 204, at 3.
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more attention to this one. 238 The legislature enacted the necessary enabling legislation, and convention delegates were elected from the same districts, by the same procedures, and in the same number as state representa239
tives, seventy-five at that time. In January 1862 the Third Illinois Constitutional Convention convened. Democrats, from the southern part of the
state, dominated the convention leadership. 240 The nation was in a Civil
War, the tides of war were running badly for Union forces, and a number of
southern Illinoisans were sympathetic to the Confederate cause. During the
convention, many delegates were accused of disloyalty. 241 "Moreover, the
convention acted far beyond the scope of its authority., 242 The convention
adopted a partisan constitution containing provisions that were anti-bank,
anti-corporation, anti-railroad, and pro-farmer. 243 The proposed constitution
was adopted by only fifty-four of the original seventy-five delegates, including only three of the twenty-one Republican delegates. 2 " Most Republican newspapers were against the proposed charter, while most Democrat
newspapers defended it. 245 The proposed constitution was defeated at the
246
polls by a vote of 125,052 for and 141,103 against.
3.

1870 Constitution

As soon as the Civil War ended and Reconstruction began, agitation
resumed for constitutional change. In 1867, Republican Governor Richard
J. Oglesby urged the call for a constitutional convention, which the legislature approved.24 7 In 1868, the people approved, by a narrow margin, the call
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 46.
238.
1859 11. Laws 217 (submitting convention call to voters).
239.
Of the seventy-five delegates elected, forty-five were regular Democrats,
240.
twenty-one were Republicans, seven were affiliated with other political parties, and two had
unidentified political affiliation. CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 46.
Id.
241.
The Third Illinois Constitutional Convention "investigated the executive de242.
partment, attempted to ratify a proposed amendment to the United States Constitution and to
redistrict the state for representatives to Congress, and further attempted to issue bonds and
enact laws by passing ordinances." Howard R. Sacks & Peter A. Tomei, Report of the Committee on ConstitutionalRevision of the Chicago Bar Association on a ConstitutionalConventionfor Illinois, 48 CHI. B. REc., Feb.-Mar. 1967, at 56, 71.
243.
GovE & KITsos, supra note 204, at 4; see also CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 4653.
GOVE &NOwLAN, supra note 185, at 70.
244.
245.
Id.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 54. Commentators have opined that voters rejected
246.
the proposed constitution due to popular aversion to the convention's excesses, coupled with
the popular belief that the charter favored the South rather than the North. Sacks & Tomei,
supra note 242, at 71.
247.
GoVE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 70.
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for a convention. In November 1869 delegates were elected, and they were
divided almost evenly between Democrats and Republicans. In December
1869 the Fourth Illinois Constitutional Convention convened.2 48 The convention organized itself on a bipartisan basis; a mood of conciliation and
compromise prevailed.249 Such an atmosphere was difficult to establish in
the immediate post-Civil War period; however, the delegates remembered
that partisanship had discredited and defeated the proposed 1862 Constitution. Accordingly, they made great efforts "in 1870 to refrain from bringing
political animosities into constitution making., 250 After five months of
work, the convention adopted a constitution in May 1870.251
The product of the Fourth Illinois Constitutional Convention was
longer and more detailed than earlier charters, signifying the growth in
complexity of the state's needs.2 52 Also, the delegates continued the practice of using the state constitution not only as a statement of fundamental
principles, but also as an instrument of legislative policy. The proposed
constitution resembled its 1848 predecessor in its excessive detail of matters that would have been best left to statute. Although the delegates removed many of the restrictions contained in the 1848 Constitution, they
drafted other restrictions for the proposed constitution that were superfluous
or harmful. 253 The proposed constitution also provided for a multi-district
house of representatives, with cumulative voting, which permitted minority
representation.2 54 The charter conferred upon the governor full appointment
powers and a stronger veto, expanded the supreme court to seven justices,
and included a new public education article; however, "the amendment
process became even more restrictive. 255
The Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was ratified in 1865, and the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868.256 These
Civil War amendments effectively overruled article XIV of the 1848 Illinois Constitution, which prohibited the immigration of African Americans
into the States, and the article remained on the books as a dead letter until it
was omitted from the 1870 Illinois Constitution.257
61.

248.

GOVE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 4; see also CORNELIUS, supranote 7, at 56-

249.
250.
251.
252.

CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at

62-64.
GoVE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 4-5.

supra note 7, at 64, 81.
GOVE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 5; GOVE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 70.
253.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 65.
254.
ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IV, § 7 (multi-district house); see also CORNELIUS,
supra note 7, at 65-81.
255.
Witwer, supra note 183, at XXVI; see also ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. V, § 10
(appointment), § 16 (veto), art. VI (courts), art. VIII (education), art. XIV (amendment).
256.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (1865); U.S. CONST. amend XIV (1968).
257.
See Fishback, supra note 196, at 431.
CORNELIUS,
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Most political leaders and major newspapers supported the proposed
constitution. 58 In July 1870 the people ratified the 1870 Constitution by a
nearly 80% favorable vote. 259 Two main factors were behind the overwhelming voter approval. First, the public was greatly dissatisfied with the
performance of Illinois state government, and the public believed that constitutional changes would substantially improve the performance of state
government. 22660 Second, the bipartisanship displayed at the convention and
reflected in its product did not arouse any major opposition. 26' The 1870
Constitution took effect on August 8, 1870.
B.

PROBLEMS WITH THE 1870 CONSTITUTION

In the late nineteenth century, the 1870 Illinois Constitution was considered a reform document.262 Its restrictions and limitations, however,
caused many problems for state officials, especially regarding finances;
"[f]or example, because of strict constitutional limitations on local government debt," the legislature established a large number of "special districts."
These entities would subsequently exemplify the state's "parochialism and
lack of coordinated planning. 26 3 Also, the 1870 Constitution provided that
the General Assembly was not to appropriate out of the state treasury more
than the aggregate sum of $3,500,000 for the new state capitol in Springfield.2 64 "As might have been expected, the money ran out and the statehouse was never completed according to the original plans. 265 Indeed, the
excessive and extensive266detail in the 1870 Constitution soon made many of
its provisions obsolete.
Exacerbating the situation, the restrictive amendment process grew
more so over time for two reasons. First, the 1870 Constitution required that
a proposed constitutional amendment pass both houses by a two-thirds majority before submission to voters. 267 However, the two-thirds majority was
often difficult to achieve under the new constitutional system of cumulative
258.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 81-82; GOVE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 6.
259.
Witwer, supra note 183, at XXVI; see also CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 83.
260.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 83-84; GovE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 6.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 83-84; GovE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 6.
261.
262.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 85.
263.
GOVE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 71.
264.
ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IV, § 33.
GovE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 71.
265.
266.
GOVE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 5; Witwer, supra note 183, at XXVI. Another example lies with the Columbian Exposition of 1893 (i.e., the 1893 World's Fair),
which was held in Chicago. To overcome debt limitations, the constitution was amended in
1890 to allow Chicago to issue $5,000,000 worth of bonds to finance the fair. The constitution was burdened with another non-fundamental provision more suitable for a statute. See
ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IX, § 12.
267.
ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. XIV.
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voting for state representatives, which generated a permanently large minority. 268
Second, if a proposed constitutional amendment eventually reached
the voters, the ballot itself became an impediment to voter ratification.
From 1848 to 1891, each political party printed its own ballots and distributed them to voters at elections. 269 The party convention or committee established the party's position on proposed constitutional amendments.27 °
Political parties distributed several alternative ballots, and some party ballots simply omitted any reference to a constitutional proposal.2 7' Other
party ballots contained language that indicated both the affirmative and
negative statement of the constitutional proposal, and required the voter to
scratch out or delete the undesired choice.27 2 The failure to make a mark
would constitute a non-vote on the proposition, which equaled a "no"
vote.273 Other party ballots would include a phrase that indicated either
voter consent to or rejection of the proposition; if the voter deposited such a
ballot, without alteration, in the ballot box, it was a vote either for or
against the proposition, whether or not the voter was aware of it.274 Under
the party ballot system, "[a] measure approved by both parties had no trouble getting the popular vote necessary for approval... [since] the vote on
proposed constitutional amendments
often approximated the total number
' 275
election.
the
in
cast
votes
of
These ballots are proof enough how the methods of voting
prior to 1891 made it relatively easy to adopt constitutional
proposals in Illinois in that period, if the party leaders were
generally in favor of them. The indifference and ignorance
of so many voters on such proposals were turned into affirmative votes rather than permitted to be counted as negative voters. This was the method of voting known to those
who drafted the constitution of 1870 and they did not con-

268.

CORNELIUS,

supra note 7, at 90.

269.
Kenneth C. Sears, ConstitutionalRevision and Party Circle Bills, 14 U. CHI. L.
REv. 200, 210-13 (1947) (depicting photographs of party ballots); see also Alden L. Powell,
A Plan for FacilitatingConstitutional Amendment in Illinois, 30 ILL. L. REv. 59, 60-61
(1935).
270.
See Sears, supra note 269, at 210-13; see also Powell, supra note 269, at 60-61.
271.
See Sears, supra note 269, at 210-13; see also Powell, supra note 269, at 60-61.
272.
See Sears,supra note 269, at 210-13; see also Powell, supranote 269, at 60-61.
273.
See Sears, supra note 269, at 210-13; see also Powell, supranote 269, at 60-61.
274.
See Sears, supra note 269, at 210-13; see also Powell, supra note 269, at 60-61.
275.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 89 (citation omitted).
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template the very different method of voting adopted
twenty-one years later.276
Accordingly, "[u]nder this system the adoption of constitutional amendments was not difficult, for, out of five proposed amendments, five were
adopted. 277
In 1891, however, the legislature enacted an official ballot law, under
which a proposed constitutional amendment was printed on the ballot with
blank spaces to indicate either consent or rejection. The voter was required
to specifically mark the ballot to indicate the voter's choice; the failure to
do so was considered a failure to have voted at all on the proposition,
thereby effectively counting the vote as a "no." 278 In each of the general
elections of 1892, 1894, and 1896, at least 75% of those voting in the general election did not vote on a proposed constitutional amendment, which
consequently failed to receive the necessary majority vote. 279 The change in
ballot format caused an increase of nonvoting on proposed constitutional
amendments from an average of 23% prior to 1891 to an average of 78%
subsequent to 189 1.280
In reaction to these stark statistics, the legislature revised the election
laws to provide for printing constitutional proposals on a separate ballot.
The separate, or "little," ballot initially appeared to have its anticipated result, because the first two of the next five proposed constitutional amendments were ratified.2 8' Yet, it still remained difficult for a constitutional
proposition to obtain the affirmative vote of a majority of those voting in an
election. In 1929, the legislature repealed the separate ballot law and provided that proposed constitutional amendments be placed on the regular
ballot to the left of the names of the candidates for office. 282 "Thus, in a
practical sense the method of amending the 1870 Illinois [C]onstitution was
completely revolutionized as an unexpected by-product of a reform in the
ballot law in 1891. "283 What had previously been a reasonably simple
method of "adopting amendments became an impossible method under the

276.
Sears, supra note 269, at 211.
277.
Charles V. Laughlin, A Study in Constitutional Rigidity I, 10 U. CHI. L. REv.
142, 152 (1943); see also Powell, supra note 269, at 61 n.5 (listing ratified constitutional
amendments between 1870 and 1891).
CORNELIus, supra note 7, at 90; see also GOVE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 6.
278.
Laughlin, supra note 277, at 151 (depicting voting statistics in Table 1).
279.
280.
Powell, supra note 269, at 61 n.6.
281.
Id. at 62.
282.
Laughlin, supra note 277, at 152-53; Powell, supra note 269, at 62-63.
283.
Sears, supra note 269, at 211.
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ballot law existing from 1891 to 1899, a difficult method under the little
(separate) ballot law from 1899 to 1918, and a total failure" after 1924.284
In his 1893 inaugural address, Governor Peter Altgeld suggested a
constitutional convention. The state senate adopted a resolution to that effect, but the house of representatives defeated the proposal.285 Attempts at
constitutional change continued. In 1915, a statewide constitutional convention committee of the Citizens' Association of Chicago replaced the Constitutional Convention League organized the previous year. 286 "[T]his association continued to agitate for submission of a convention call to the voters. ''287 Also, in 1916, Frank 0. Lowden was elected governor. A reformminded, progressive Chicago attorney and politician, Governor Lowden
advocated for a constitutional convention.2 88 In his inaugural message to the
legislature, he urged for a convention call. In 1917, the legislature approved
the call and, in 1918, voters approved the call for a constitutional convention.289 In 1919, the legislature enacted enabling legislation for the convention. 290 The election of delegates resulted in an overwhelming, one-sided
Republican victory, producing eighty-five Republican and seventeen Democrat delegates.291
The Fifth Illinois Constitutional Convention convened in January 1920
and adjourned in September 1922. Because of its poor organization, "the
convention became known for lengthy recesses and absenteeism among
delegates.' 292 The proposed 1922 Constitution "was a major revision that
differed sharply in language and organization from that of 1870. It included
many controversial matters, and was submitted as a single 'package' as
284.
Id. Indeed, in a 1917 court challenge to the amendment ratification requirement
of a majority of votes cast in the election, the Illinois Supreme Court relied on the plain
language of the 1870 Constitution in construing "the relevant 'majority' to be a majority of
the highest number of votes cast with respect to an office or a proposition in the general
election." Witwer, supra note 183, at XXVII (discussing People v. Stevenson, 117 N.E. 747
(I11.1917)).
285.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 88-89.
286.
Id. at 94.
287.
Id. at 94 (citation omitted).
288.
Id. at 95-97.
289.
S.J. Res. 1, 50th Senate (1917), 1917 Ill. Laws 805; see also CORNELIUS, supra
note 7, at 95-97; GOVE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 7; GOVE & NOWLAN, supranote 185, at
71.
290.
1919 I11.Laws 60, 63.
291.
See CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 98; GOvE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 7; see
also GOVE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 71 ("Like the ill-fated convention of 1862, however, partisan lines were drawn and the Republicans this time came out on top.").
292.
GovE & NowLAN, supra note 185, at 71-72; accordCORNELIUS, supra note 7, at
103 ("The convention, officially in session for almost three years, spent only 140 days in
actual convention work." (citation omitted)); GOvE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 7; Sacks &
Tomei, supra note 242, at 71-72 (commenting that, despite extensive pre-convention preparations, the convention became "bogged down in detail and debate").
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contrasted to earlier constitutions that were submitted with several separate
issues. '293 It expressly permitted Bible reading in public schools, expressly
guaranteed equal protection without regard to race or color, established a
reapportionment plan that was generally favorable to downstate Illinois at
the expense of Cook County, dropped the system of cumulative voting for
state representatives, established a graduated state income tax, and notably,
did little to relax the restrictive amendment procedures of the 1870 Constitution. 294
In December 1922 voters overwhelmingly defeated the proposed constitution in a very heavy turnout for a special election. Scholars have cited
many factors for the crushing rejection, including "primarily the partisanship of the convention, the submission of the document as a whole, the loss
of popular interest because of the length of the convention, the attempt to
rewrite the entire constitution, and the lack of liberal amending procedures. 295 Voters failed to ratify the proposed 1862 Constitution primarily
because the Third Illinois Constitutional Convention alienated a single major group, i.e., the Republican Party; however, the Fifth Illinois Constitutional Convention "managed not only to alienate some Republican party
members, but also most of the Democrats, labor unions, teachers, judges,
and many
other groups in the state, including most Cook County resi2 96
dents.

Subsequent to the "disastrous results" of the Fifth Illinois Constitutional Convention, state leaders repeatedly attempted, unsuccessfully, to
amend the 1870 Constitution through its restrictive amendment procedure.297 In 1934, a call for a constitutional convention was submitted to
voters. "The campaign for it was a modest effort; it was not a high-pressure
affair. Yet, the proposal received a majority of 105,142 of those who voted
on the proposal. 298 Although the call received more "yes" votes than "no"

293.
GovE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 7.
294.
GovE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 7-8; see also CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at
111-12; Philip R. Davis, Defects and Causes of Defeat of the ProposedConstitution of 1922,
26 CHI. B. REc. 276 (1945) (criticizing the proposed 1922 Constitution).
295.
GovE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 8; accordCORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 115;
Peter A. Tomei, How Not to Hold a ConstitutionalConvention, 49 CHI. B. REc. 179 (1968)
(criticizing the Fifth Illinois Constitutional Convention).
296.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 115-16; see also GOVE & KiTSOS, supra note 204,
at 8.
297.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 116; GovE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 8.
298.
Sears, supra note 269, at 209. For a discussion both for and against the convention call, see Floyd E. Thompson & David R. Clarke, Shall We Have a ConstitutionalConvention?, 16 CHI.B. REc., Oct. 1934, at 9.
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votes, 56% of those voting in the election did not vote on the proposal, and
thereby caused its defeat.2 99
Generally, by the late 1930s and 1940s, nineteenth-century state constitutions, like that of Illinois', were in great disrepute. 300 Their superfluous
provisions and restrictions, in addition to their antiquated and faulty legal
terminology, appeared to function mainly to impede needed progress and
development. "In Illinois, a small group of constitutional scholars and political scientists kept the issue of constitutional revision alive. 30 1
Illinois, everything considered, is in the worst position
of any state in the Union. A majority of its voters who have
any ideas to express have frequently shown that they think
that their constitution is in need of a general revision. But,
owing to the rigid and restrictive provisions for a revision
or amendment, Illinois flounders around in its constitutional morass. It is a ridiculous spectacle for what is supposed to be one of the great states in the United States.
Only one judgment can be uttered: Illinois has been politically backward and heaven alone knows when it will become ashamed of itself and exhibit political astuteness.
There are ways out of the morass whenever Illinois secures
the political leadership that can overcome the forces that
302
believe in a relatively static society.
These efforts resulted in a "gateway" to hoped-for constitutional reform.
In 1949, newly-elected Governor Adlai E. Stevenson, a Democrat,
submitted to the Illinois General Assembly a package of proposed legislation that included a call for a constitutional convention, and which would
have amended the election laws to facilitate its approval by the voters.30 3
The governor's proposal was defeated in a close vote in the state house of
representatives. 304 Republicans, however, introduced in the state senate the
299.
See Laughlin, supra note 277, at 151-52 (describing in Table 1, Illinois voter
statistics regarding the submission of seventeen amendments to the Illinois Constitution of
1870, and the two proposals to call a constitutional convention).
300.
CORNELIUS, supranote 7, at 120.
Id.
301.
302.
Charles V. Laughlin, A Study in ConstitutionalRigidity 11, 11 U. CHI. L. REv.
374, 439 (1944); see also Samuel W. Witwer, Jr., A ConstitutionalConvention for Illinois,
37 ILL. B.J. 9, 10 (1948) ("That there is a need for major constitutional revision in Illinois is
hardly open to question. Even among those who resist change for one reason or another, few
will deny that the 1870 constitution is failing in many serious respects to meet the needs of
our modem industrialized society.").

303.

CORNELIUS,

supra note 7, at 122-23.

304.
GOVE & Krrsos, supra note 204, at 9. The proposed election law amendment
would have placed the call on the ballot under the "party circle" (i.e., the position adopted by
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"Gateway Amendment" as an alternative to the proposed convention call.
First proposed in the 1892 general election, a "gateway amendment" sought
to open "a gate-way to the Constitution" 30 5 by amending the article permitting amendment of the constitution to ease the restrictive voting requirement.3 °6 This particular gateway amendment provided that voters could
ratify state constitutional amendments by an affirmative vote of two-thirds
of those voting on the amendment itself, or alternatively, by the formerly
sole requirement of a majority of those voting in the election. 30 7 With the
governor's support, the Gateway Amendment easily passed both houses of
the Illinois General Assembly.30 8 The legislature also revised the election
laws to require that constitutional proposals be submitted to voters on a
separate blue ballot.30 9 Printed on the blue ballot was the notice: "The failure to vote this ballot is the equivalent of a negative vote."30 As a result of
the blue ballot and a strong campaign, the Gateway Amendment received
an overwhelmingly affirmative vote in the November 1950 general election. 3 '1
Generally, proponents of constitutional revision enthusiastically
greeted the Gateway Amendment.3 12 Constitutional change through
amendment appeared to be a better alternative than calling for a constitutional convention.3 13 The Illinois General Assembly employed the gateway
procedure beginning in 1951; however, the enthusiasm for the amendment

each political party). Accordingly, "[a] straight party vote would necessarily include a vote
for or against the proposition depending upon the position adopted by each party at its state
convention." CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 122; see also GovE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at
9.
Powell, supra note 269, at 67; accord Proposed 1970 Constitution-Official
305.
Text with Explanation, in 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 2672 (1970) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS] (observing that Gateway Amendment
was "so-called because it was expected that it would open the way to easier constitutional
change by amendment").
GovE & KITsOs, supra note 204, at 6; Powell, supra note 269, at 64. In the 1892
306.
general election, the first proposed gateway amendment "was soundly defeated, primarily
because 79 percent of the voters failed to mark their ballots on the question." CORNELIUS,
supra note 7, at 90; Laughlin, supra note 277, at 151 tbl. 1; Powell, supra note 269, at 61 n.6.
GOvE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 9; Gove & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 72307.
73. Also, the Gateway Amendment was narrow: "The proposal did not alter the requirement
for calling a constitutional convention, which would still have to receive the favorable votes
of a majority of all persons voting in a general election." CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 123.
Gove &NOwLAN, supra note 185, at 73.
308.
Id.
309.
Id.
310.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 124-25; GovE & Ki'sos, supra note 204, at 9,
311.
GOVE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 73.
GovE & NowLAN, supranote 185, at 73.
312.
Id.
313.
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approach cooled due to the disappointing record of success.3 14 From 1952
through 1966, the legislature submitted fifteen constitutional amendments
to voters, who ratified only six. 315 Particularly discouraging were the three
unsuccessful attempts to amend the revenue article.3 16 Only two of the six
reapportionment
ratified amendments were far-reaching-the 1954
317
amendment and the 1962 judicial article amendment.
Subsequent to the early 1960s, the cumulative effect of generations of
effort to modernize the Illinois Constitution, which the Gateway Amendment temporarily diverted, again impelled the demand for a state constitutional convention.3 18 In 1965, the Illinois General Assembly created the first
Constitution Study Commission.3 19 In 1967, the Commission recommended
that the legislature submit a convention call to voters in the November 1968
election. 320 Accepting the recommendation, the legislature voted overwhelmingly in favor of submitting a convention call to voters. 3 1 Through
the cooperation of concerned citizens and Governor Otto Kemer, the Illinois Committee for Constitutional Convention (ICCC) "came into being to
develop favorable public opinion throughout the state., 322 The ICCC "became the clearinghouse for and manager of the referendum campaign...
[and] operated what was perhaps the most vigorous and best planned campaign ever conducted for a constitutional proposal in Illinois. ' 323 The basic
strategy for the campaign required the strong support of both political parties; the support of agricultural, business, civic, labor, and professional organizations; and the unremitting support of the mass media.3 24 This widespread support required an "issueless" campaign; i.e., Con-Con proponents
attempted to avoid potentially divisive issues.325
314.
GOVE & KITSOS, supra note 204, at 10.
315.
Id.
316.
GOvE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 73.
317.
CORNELIuS, supra note 7, at 125-37; GovE & KITsOS, supra note 204, at 10-11;
GOVE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 73.
318.
Witwer, supra note 183, at XXVIII.
319.
1965 Ill. Laws 3059; see also CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 139-40 ("The General Assembly gave the commission a broad directive to examine all sections of the constitution, to determine where revisions should be made, and whether such changes would best be
accomplished by amendment or by the calling of a convention.").
320.
GOVE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 73.
321.
See CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 139-40; GOVE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at
73; Witwer, supra note 183, at XXVIII.
322.
ELMER GERTZ & JOSEPH P. PISCIOTTE, CHARTER FOR A NEW AGE: AN INSIDE
VIEW OF THE SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUrIONAL CONVENTION 9 (1980).
323.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 141; accordWitwer, supra note 183, at XXVIII.
324.
See GERTZ & PiscIomIE, supra note 322, at 27.
325.
See id. The call for Con-Con was not unanimous; however, opposition groups
were uncoordinated and conflicting. See id. Although the AFL-CIO opposed Con-Con, the
United Auto Workers and a few smaller unions endorsed Con-Con. Id. at 31. Some groups
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For example, the campaign for Con-Con benefitted from the full support of the organized Bar. Both the Illinois State and the Chicago Bar Associations supported the legislature's submission of a convention call to voters and recommended voter approval.326 Indeed, in June 1968 the two bar
associations held a joint luncheon to promote Con-Con.3 27 The associations
invited the two gubernatorial candidates to appear and give their views on
the convention call. 328 Both candidates supported Con-Con. 329 During this
time, additional authors produced several articles supporting Con-Con.33 °
Further, the Illinois Election Code "officially" dissuaded voters from
abstaining on the proposed convention call.331 In precincts that used paper
ballots, the Election Code required that the blue ballot be conspicuously
identified and placed on top of all other ballots as they were handed to voters. 332 In precincts that used voting machines, the Election Code required
voters to vote the blue ballot and deposit it in the ballot box as a prerequisite to entering the voting machine.333 Approximately 4.7 million persons
voted in the November 1968 general election. Approximately 2.9 million
voters-60% of the total-voted in favor of the convention call.334 This was
the greatest affirmative vote ever given to any constitutional proposal in
Illinois.335
C.

SIXTH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (CON-CON)

Following the recommendation of the first Constitution Study Commission, the legislature created a second Constitution Study Commission to
continue preparations in the event that voters approved the convention
call.336 The second commission produced, among other things, recommendations for enabling legislation for the convention. 337 In October 1969 the
warned that business interests would control Con-Con, while other groups "warned of impending socialism." See id. at 30.
326.
Sacks & Tomei, supra note 242; Gerald C. Snyder, Committee on Constitutional
Amendments, 56 ILL. B.J. 54 (Supp. 1968).
327.
Richard B. Ogilvie & Gov. Samuel H. Shapiro, The GubernatorialCandidates'
Views on a ConstitutionalConventionfor Illinois, 56 ILL. B.J. 1004 (1968).
328.
Ogilvie & Shapiro, supra note 327, at 1004.
329.
Id. at 1007-09.
330.
See, e.g., Robert W. Bergstrom, Why A Constitutional Convention for Illinois,
56 ILL. B.J. 634 (1968); Jordan J. Hillman & James T. Otis, Some Comments on the "Case"
Against Con-Con, 57 ILL. B.J. 98 (1968).
331.
GERTZ & PISCIOTTE, supra note 322, at 31.
332.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, §§ 16-6, 17-9 (1967).
333.
Id. § 24-11.
334.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 144.
335.
Witwer, supra note 183, at XXVIII.
1967 Ill. Laws 2001; see CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 144.
336.
337.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 144.
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legislature created a third commission to provide for the organization of,
and temporary staff for, the convention. 338 Following the recommendation
of the second commission, the legislature passed the Enabling Act, which
the governor signed in May 1969. 3 39 The Enabling Act provided for the
election of 116 delegates, two from each of the fifty-eight state senate districts, in a non-partisan election process. 340 The Enabling Act also appropriated funds for the convention and for the compensation of delegates and
officers. 341 A September 1969 "primary" election narrowed the number of
candidates down to four from each district. 342 A November 1969 election
finally selected each district's two delegates.3 43
On December 8, 1969, the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention
("Con-Con") convened. 344 The delegates adopted rules and elected a president, three vice presidents, and a secretary.345 The rules provided for nine
substantive and three procedural standing committees.346 Con-Con vested
the president with the power to designate the membership and chairpersons
of these committees.3 47 The president, Samuel W. Witwer, had been quietly
building trust and alliances during the previous twenty years.3 48 For the
most part, Witwer formed twelve committees that were balanced and would
not fall back on partisan lines; a single controversial issue would not overwhelm them. 349 Although Con-Con convened without staff, it eventually
338.
See Pub. Act 76-476, 1969 Ill. Laws 1110; see also CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at
144 n.6.
339,
Pub. Act 76-40, 1969 Ill. Laws 57.
340.
Id.; see also Witwer, supra note 183, at XXIX.
341.
Pub. Act 76-40, 1969 I11.Laws 57. In July 1969, the Illinois Supreme Court,
among other things, upheld the nonpartisan election procedure, delineated which public
officials could and could not serve as convention delegates, and upheld the constitutionality
of the Enabling Act. Livingston v. Ogilvie, 250 N.E.2d 138, 147 (I11.1969).
342.
Witwer, supra note 183, at XXX.
343.
Journal of Dec. 8, 1969, in 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 305, at 1-4; Delegate
Biographies, in 1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 305, at 853-910; Proposed 1970 ConstitutionOfficial Text with Explanation, in 7 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 305, at 2770; see also
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 144-47; GERTZ & PISCIOTTE, supra note 322, at 10; Witwer,
supra note 183, at XXIX.
344.
GERTZ & PISCIOTTE, supra note 322, at 36.
345.
Id. at 36-64. Con-Con did not select a treasurer because the state auditor held all
convention funds. Witwer, supra note 183, at XXIX.
346.
GERTZ & PiscIorrE, supra note 322, at 67; see also Convention Rules, in 1
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 305, at 845 (providing a listing of all the rules and listing the ConCon committees at Rules 14 and 15).
347.
GERTZ & PISCIOTTE, supra note 322, at 67; see also Convention Rules, in 1
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 305, at 845 (providing a listing of all the rules and listing the ConCon committees at Rules 14 and 15).
348.
GovE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 74.
349.
GERTZ & PISCIOTTE, supra note 322, at 7 1; GovE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at
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assembled a staff of approximately one hundred persons. 35 Joseph
Pisciotte, the executive director, "oversaw a small army of clerks, lawyers,
writers, researchers, committee aides, a parliamentarian, messengers, and
doorkeepers. This staff and structure were based on those of other states'
conventions and help explain the volume and quality of work that was
turned out by the delegates. 351
Con-Con recessed for the holidays and resumed on January 6, 1970.352
Delegates submitted 582 proposals for constitutional reform.353 The convention president assigned these proposals to the pertinent substantive
committees.354 Each committee researched, reviewed, and publicly debated
these delegate proposals, as well as proposals initiated within the committee
itself.355 Although committees generally met in Springfield, the substantive
committees held public meetings in seventeen Illinois cities.356 A total of
seven thousand citizens attended these regional hearings, at which over one
thousand witnesses testified.35 7 Another eight hundred witnesses testified in
Springfield. 358 "The goal of this activity was to give Illinois citizens direct
access to convention proceedings, and to keep the convention before the
public as an open deliberative body, truly considering the issues as they
not acting on decisions already made in back room party
were presented,
359
caucuses."
The committees then filed majority reports, which presented their recommendations for revising the 1870 Constitution and for proposed articles
of a new constitution.3 60 Any three committee members could file, as part
of the committee report, a minority position with recommendations.36 1 ConCon met as a committee whole, gave full consideration to both the majority
and minority positions, and then acted upon the recommendations. 362 ConCon rules required three readings prior to the final adoption of any constitu-

350.
Witwer, supra note 183, at XXIX.
GovE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 74. For an extended discussion of Con351.
Con staff, see GERTZ & PiscIorrE, supra note 322, at 81-87.
352.
1 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 305, at 41 (including journal entry for December 17,
1969, showing adjournment until January 6, 1970); id. at 43 (including journal entry for
January 6, 1970).
353.
1970 Member Proposals, in 7 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 305, at 2843-3112.
Witwer, supra note 183, at XXIX.
354.
Id.
355.
Id.
356.
CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 151-52.
357.
358.
Id.
359.
Id. at 152.
360.
Witwer, supra note 183, at XXIX.
Id.
361.
Id.
362.
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tional provision
or revision, which was accomplished by a majority of the
363
roll call vote:
This process, briefly and categorically described, shows at
once the potential for achieving a wise result. The built-in
safeguards, the public attention focused upon the deliberations, the desire of each delegate to express himself fully
and frankly, the general atmosphere that is part of a constitutional convention, all contributed to a result in which virtually every delegate took pride. 364
Con-Con adjourned on September 3, 1970.365
D.

RATIFICATION

Con-Con submitted to voters a main "package" pertaining to the proposed constitution and four separate proposals: (1) abolishing cumulative
voting for multiple-member house districts in favor of single-member districts, (2) choosing between the election and the appointment of judges, (3)
abolishing the death penalty, and (4) lowering the voting age to eighteen.366
Con-Con submitted these proposals to voters on the blue ballot in a special
referendum scheduled for December 15, 1970.367
Many interest groups supported the proposed constitution, while a few
others opposed it. Special interest groups formed to support or oppose cer363.
GERTZ & PiscioTTE, supra note 322, at 102-08; Witwer, supra note 183, at
XXIX.
364.
GERTZ & PiscioTrE, supra note 322, at 103.
365.
Journal of Sept. 3, 1970, in I PROCEEDINGS, supra note 305, at 781-818; see
GOVE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 74. For an extended discussion of the winding up of
Con-Con, see GERTZ & PISCIOTrE, supra note 322, at 310-26.
366.
1970 Constitution as Adopted by the Convention, in 7 PROCEEDINGS, supra note
305, at 2664; Proposed 1970 Constitution--Official Text with Explanation, in 7
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 305, at 2679-80; GOVE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 75-76;
Witwer, supra note 183, at XXX. Voters would have been asked to choose between Options
1-A (cumulative voting) and 1-B (single-member districts) for the election of state representatives, and between Options 2-A (election) and 2-B (merit selection) for the selection of
judges. CORNELItUS, supra note 7, at 155. Additionally, "[i]f neither option received a majority of those voting in the election, the 1870 provisions on each issue would have remained"
controlling. CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 155 n.24.
367.
Witwer, supra note 183, at XXX. If Con-Con submitted the proposed constitution to voters at the 1970 general election, then the strict amendment provisions of the 1870
Illinois Constitution would govern, and a general election voter who failed to vote on the
constitutional proposition would have the effect of a "no" vote. Id. This would pose serious
doubts of securing the required majority vote of all those voting in the general election. Id.
Therefore, Con-Con decided to hold a separate referendum. Con-Con chose December 15th
because the 1870 Illinois Constitution required an election to be held from two to six months
subsequent to convention adjournment. Id.
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tain issues. 368 Voters ratified the proposed constitution by an affirmative
56% bipartisan vote. 369 Regarding the separate side issues, voters retained
cumulative voting for multiple-member house districts, an elected judiciary,
and the death penalty, but rejected lowering the voting age to eighteen.370
The 1970 Illinois Constitution became effective July 1, 1971, except as
provided in its schedules.37 1
This article will now turn from the history of the 1970 Illinois Constitution to its content, explaining how the current constitution fulfills the general purposes of state constitutions.
IV.

CONTENT OF THE 1970 ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION

"Many of the changes made in the 1970 Constitution were important;
others were relatively minor. ' '372 Indeed, by the time Con-Con delegates
were finished,
hardly an article in the [1870 Constitution] was left unchanged despite the desire to alter only that which needed
alteration. The delegates had cut four thousand or so obsolete words out of the old constitution .... Their aim was to
write a constitution and not a statutory code, as much of the
old constitution had been.373
Thanks to the efforts of those who prepared the way for Con-Con, and the
efforts of Con-Con delegates, the 1970 Illinois Constitution "is considered
to be one of the most advanced [state constitutions] in the country. 374 The
1970 Constitution (1) declares and guarantees the rights and liberties of the
people, (2) establishes the framework or structure of Illinois state government, and (3) institutes fundamental policy. 375 In addition, the 1970 Illinois
Constitution establishes a more enlightened amendment procedure than its
1870 predecessor.376
368.
GovE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 76.
369.
Id.
370.
1970 Constitution as Approved by the Electorate, in 7 PROCEEDINGS, supra note
305, at 2775-85; see also CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 161-63; GovE & NOWLAN, supra note
185, at 76; Witwer, supra note 183, at XXX.
371.
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN., ILL. CONST., at 47 (West 2006).
372.
GOvE& NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 74.
373.
GERTZ & PISCiolTTE, supra note 322, at 12.
374.
Daniel J. Elazar, The Principlesand Traditions Underlying State Constitutions,
12 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 11, 20 (1982).
375.
ILL. CONST. art. I (bill of rights), arts. H-VII (framework/structure), arts. VIIIXIII (fundamental policy).
376.
For checklists of changes contained in the 1970 Illinois Constitution, see GovE
& KITSOS, supra note 204, at 114-16 tbl.3; GERTZ & PISCIOTrE, supra note 322, at 12-21.
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A constitution begins with a preamble. Generally, a preamble to a state
constitution repeats "certain first principles regarding the nature and purposes of government., 37 7 "Preambles have never evoked much political
controversy and, strictly speaking, are not operative parts of a constitution., 378 Con-Con delegates likewise viewed a preamble as hortatory and
not creating any substantive rights. 379 The preamble to the 1970 Constitution includes the declared aspirations of the 1870 Constitution, but adds
aspirations "undreamed of in the middle of the nineteenth century, such as:
'eliminate poverty and inequality; assure legal, social and economic justice;
provide opportunity for the fullest development of the individual.' They are
resounding phrases, reflecting great aims even if they are not operating but
simply hortatory, constitutional sermons. 38 °
A.

DECLARES/RECOGNIZES RIGHTS (ARTICLE I)

Article I of the 1970 Illinois Constitution contains the state bill of
rights.38s The Illinois Bill of Rights fulfills the ancient constitutional purpose of limiting and restraining governmental power. Article I also accords
with fundamental principles of American government by expressly recognizing that its "enumeration ... of certain rights shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the individual citizens of the State. 382
The substantive changes to the Illinois Bill of Rights included several
revisions. In addition to guaranteeing that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without the due process of law, the constitution
now expressly guarantees the equal protection of the laws. 3 83 Con-Con
Fellman, supra note 86, at 139; accord BRADEN & COHN, supra note 7, at 1
377.
("[Glenerally, a preamble is intended to be a broad statement of purpose of the document
which follows.").
378.
BRADEN & CoHN, supra note 7, at 1. Just as the preamble to a state constitution
cannot enlarge constitutional limitations on state government, the Preamble to the United
States Constitution cannot enlarge any power that the Federal Constitution elsewhere confers
on the Federal government. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905).
379.
Robert A. Helman & Wayne W. Whalen, Constitutional Commentary, in ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN., 11.Const. pmbl., at 52 (West 2006).
GERTZ & PISCIOTTE, supra note 322, at 12-13 (quoting the preamble to the Illi380.
nois Constitution).
381.
ILL. CONST. art. I.
382. Id. § 24; see also Helman & Whalen, supra note 379, art. I, § 24, at 503 ("Section 24 is new. It gives explicit recognition to the principle that the Bill of Rights is not an
all-encompassing enumeration of a citizen's rights and immunities with respect to government action.").
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2; see also Helman & Whalen, supra note 379, art. I, § 2, at
383.
62 ("The addition gives formal expression to a principle already well recognized and applied
in Illinois. The Illinois courts have frequently held that persons shall not 'be denied equal
protection of the law' as a matter of State law. Of course, the Federal equal protection clause
also applies within the State." (citations omitted)).
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added to section 6, the section pertaining to searches and seizures, "the right
to be secure ... against unreasonable ... invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means. 384
"Section 6 expands upon the individual rights which were contained in
[s]ection 6 of [a]rticle II of the 1870 [Illinois] Constitution and the guarantees of the5 Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Consti, 38
tution.
Section 7, concerning indictments and preliminary hearings, was
changed in two notable respects. First, this section recognizes that the Illinois General Assembly may not only abolish the grand jury, but by statute
may also limit or otherwise alter its use.386 Second, it was recognized that
any person accused of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment, and
who was not indicted by a grand jury, has the right to a prompt preliminary
hearing to establish probable cause.387
Section 12 guarantees the right to a legal remedy.388 This section was
changed from its predecessor provision in the 1870 Constitution by replacing the phrase "ought to" in the 1870 Constitution with the word "shall."389
The intent of the word substitution was "to make the statement of the principle more emphatic., 390 Elmer Gertz, chair of the Bill of Rights Committee, explained to Con-Con
that the provision is strengthened when the rather awkward
words "ought to" are removed and the word "shall" is substituted. And I think the net result is either the meaning is
exactly the same or is made more emphatic. It doesn't add
any new element. It doesn't create any uncertainty. It
makes1 simply a slight textual change in the public inter39
est.
ILL.CONST. art. I, § 6.
385.
Helman & Whalen, supra note 379, art. I, § 6, at 3. The protection against unreasonable invasions of privacy "is new and is stated broadly." Id.The protections against
unreasonable interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means are
"intended to reach nonmechanical means of eavesdropping, such as listening with the unaided ear and intercepting written communications." Id. at 4. Furthermore, "[s]ection 6 was
drafted to prohibit interceptions of communications by using new forms of technology unforeseeable in 1970." Id.
386.
Id. § 7.
387.
Id.
388.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12.
389.
Compare ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12 ("shall"), with ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. H, § 19
("ought to").
390.
Helman & Whalen, supra note 379, art. I, § 12, at 300.
391.
Verbatim Transcript of June 3, 1970, in 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 305, at
1490.

384.
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Its effect, however, has been argued at the convention, 392 and to this
day, litigants unsuccessfully contend that the substitution of the word
"shall" for "ought to" in the 1970 Illinois Constitution transformed section
12 into a mandatory provision. 393 However, Illinois courts have consistently
rejected this contention, holding that this rephrasing "has had, and was
meant to have, no substantive effect on Illinois law. 394 Section 12 remains
"merely an expression of a philosophy and not a mandate that a certain
3 95
remedy be provided in any specific form."
Section 14 concerns imprisonment for debt and has a predecessor section in the 1870 Constitution. 396 Con-Con added the following sentence:
"No person shall be imprisoned for failure to pay a fine in a criminal case
unless he has been afforded adequate time to make payment, in installments
if necessary, and has willfully failed to make payment., 397 "The purpose of
the new provision is to eliminate the situation where indigent defendants
are convicted and fined for an offense and are subsequently imprisoned
because of an inability to pay the fine, while financially able defendants, in
similar cases, are able to pay the fine and go free. 398 Section 15, concerning eminent domain, eliminated the special treatment that land for railroad
purposes received under the 1870 Constitution.3 99
According to one member of Con-Con's Bill of Rights Committee:
"The most important innovations in the 1970 [Illinois] Bill of Rights are
found in the anti-discrimination provisions of Sections 17, 18 and 19.A 00
Sections 17 through 19 prohibit different forms of discrimination. Section
17 provides:
All persons shall have the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of race, color, creed, national an392.
See id. at 1490-91.
393.
Indeed, subsequent to Con-Con, Mr. Gertz observed: "The revision of section
12 ...may prove to be more significant than some believe. I think the mandatory language
gives the provision much more meaning than it has had in the past." ELMER GERTZ, FOR THE
FIRST HouRs OF TOMORROW: THE NEW ILLrNOIS BILL OF RiGHTS 169 (1973); accord GERTZ
& PiscioTrE, supra note 322, at 13 ("[T]he section relating to the right to a legal remedy was
strengthened making it mandatory, rather than merely hopeful, or hortatory.").
394.
Angelini v. Snow, 374 N.E.2d 215, 218 (II1.App. Ct. 1978); accord Adams v.
City of Peoria, 396 N.E.2d 572, 574-75 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Berlin v. Nathan, 381 N.E.2d
1367, 1374 n.1 (I11.
App. Ct. 1978).
2000) (internal quota395.
Segers v. Indust. Comm'n, 732 N.E.2d 488, 496-97 (I11.
tions omitted).
396.
Compare ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 14, with ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. 11, § 12.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 14.
397.
See Helman & Whalen, supra note 379, art. I, § 14, at 367-68.
398.
Compare ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15, with ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 13. See
399.
also Helman & Whalen, supra note 379, art. I, § 15, at 677.
400.
Bernard Weisberg, Article I-Bill of Rights, 52 CHI. B. REc. 63, 64 (1970).
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cestry and sex in the hiring and promotion practices of any
employer or in the sale or rental of property.
These rights are enforceable without action by the
General Assembly, but the General Assembly by law may
establish reasonable exemptions relating to these rights and
provide additional remedies for their violation. 4 1
As applied to governmental action, section 17 is redundant because
this form of discrimination, "if committed by government, is unquestionably prohibited by the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the comparable provisions in the 1970 Constitution. ' ' 40 2 Due to the pervasive problem of discrimination, Con-Con supplemented the equal protection clause and declared a state constitutional right
to be free from discrimination by private persons in employment and in the
sale and rental of property. Section 17 prohibits discrimination by private
persons wholly apart from state action.40 3
Further, section 17 "reaches any transaction which involves the sale or
rental of personal as well as real property... [and] may therefore come into
play not only in the field of housing but in many other types of transactions
as well." 404 Section 17 limits the legislature to establishing "reasonable exemptions"
relating to these rights, and that power "is intended to be nar05
row.A

Section 18 provides: "The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex by the State or its units of local government and school districts. 40 6 Section 18 complements the equal protection
guaranty in section 2 by specifically prohibiting gender discrimination.40 7
Section 18 also complements the prohibition of discrimination in property
transactions contained in section 17. Section 18 is narrower than section 17
in that section 18 addresses only governmental action that discriminates on
the basis of gender.40 8 Section 18, however, is broader than section 17 in
that section 17 is limited to discrimination in the area of property transactions. 40 9 Also, section 19 provides: "All persons with a physical or mental
handicap shall be free from discrimination in the sale or rental of property
and shall be free from discrimination unrelated to ability in the hiring and
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.

ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
Helman & Whalen, supra note 379, art. 1,§ 17, at 479-80.
Id.
Weisberg, supra note 400, at 64.
Id.at 64-65.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18.
Helman & Whalen, supra note 379, art. I, § 18, at 488.
Id.
Id.
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promotion practices of any employer."4 "° When voters ratified the Illinois
Constitution in 1970, sections 17 through 19 were "the strongest and broadest in scope of any state constitutional provisions on the subject of discrimination."41
Section 20 is new and provides: "To promote individual dignity, communications that portray criminality, depravity, or lack of virtue in, or that
incite violence, hatred, abuse or hostility toward, a person or group of persons by reason of or by reference to religious, racial, ethnic, national or
regional affiliation are condemned.' 412 Section 20 "is strictly hortatory...
[and] is not intended to be legally operative or to vest any rights. ' 413 The
Bill of Rights Committee Report explained:
This provision seeks to encourage moderation in the use of
language that impairs the dignity of individuals by disparaging groups to which they belong. It in no way qualifies or
modifies the constitutional rights of free speech and press.
The provision creates no private right or cause of action,
and it imposes no limitation on the powers of Government.
It is purely hortatory, "a constitutional sermon." Like a preamble, such a provision is not an operative part of the
Constitution. It is included to serve a teaching purpose, to
state an idea or principle to guide the conduct of government and individual citizens.41 4
As one Con-Con delegate observed: "Section 20 seems likely to invite
misunderstanding. The general public may well assume that conduct 'condemned' by the Constitution must be unlawful."'4 5 This observation was
prophetic. Subsequent to ratification, Illinois courts have had to remind
litigants that section 20 does not create a cause of action for disparaging
communications that impair individual dignity.41 6 Certainly, reasonable

ILL. CONST. art. I, § 19.
410.
Weisberg, supra note 400, at 64.
411.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 20.
412.
413.
Hehman & Whalen, supra note 379, art. I, § 20, at 498.
6 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 305, at 83; Helman & Whalen, supra note 379, art.
414.
I, § 20, at 498.
Weisberg, supra note 400, at 68.
415.
See AIDA v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 772 N.E.2d 953, 953 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)
416.
(stating that no cause of action existed against producer of a television show that allegedly
portrayed Italian Americans in negative light); Irving v. J.L. Marsh, Inc., 360 N.E.2d 983,
App. Ct. 1977) (holding that section 20 did not create cause of action against retail
983 (I11.
store employee who referred to customer inwriting as "arrogant nigger").
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persons may question the utility of section 20.417 Perhaps, however, the
reflection of Bill of Rights Committee chair Elmer Gertz summarizes the
proper view of this section: "I feel strongly enough against the nasty and
vicious habit of stereotyping and maligning people to welcome a constitutional sermon against it. What is wrong with telling bigots they are wrong,
if you don't create a cause of action in the process?"41 8
Section 22 is new, providing as follows: "Subject only to the police
power, the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed." 41 9 By referring to "the individual citizen," section 22 affirms
and guaranties an individual right, as well as a collective right, to possess
and use arms, including firearms.420 Con-Con used both the verb "keep"
and the traditional verb "bear" to further emphasize the individual nature of
this right, which does not extend to non-citizens.42 1 Section 22, however,
does not exempt or remove individual gun ownership from government
regulation.422 The police power of government expressly limits this right.
The language of section 22 incorporates case law holding that the police
power extends to the regulation of firearms. In adopting section 22, ConCon did not intend "to invalidate laws requiring the licensing of gun owners, the registration of firearms[,] or the prohibition against carrying concealed weapons. 423
Lastly, section 24 is new and provides: "The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the individual citizens of the State."424 Section 24 expressly
recognizes "the principle that the Bill of Rights is not an all-encompassing
enumeration of
a citizen's rights and immunities with respect to govern4 25
ment action.
417.
Weisberg, supra note 400, at 68 ("Racial and ethnic jokes have shown no sign
of abating in Illinois since the Convention approved Section 20. Its likely fate is to be ignored, except for occasional notice as a relic in a museum of constitutional curiosities.").
418.
GERTZ, supra note 393, at 170.
419.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 22.
420.
Helman & Whalen, supra note 379, art. I, § 22, at 499-500.
421.
In 2008, the United States Supreme Court similarly interpreted the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct.
2783, 2799 (2008).
422.
Weisberg, supranote 400, at 67.
423.
See Helman & Whalen, supra note 379, art. I, § 22, at 500; Weisberg, supra
note 400, at 68; see also Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2816-17 (recognizing that the individual right
to keep and bear arms is subject to reasonable government regulation). For a general discussion of the police power, see James W. Hilliard & Marjorie E. Johnson, State PracticeActs
of Licensed Health Professions:Scope of Practice, 8 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 237, 23940 (2004).
424.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 24.
425.
Helman & Whalen, supranote 379, art. I, § 24, at 503; see supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
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ESTABLISHES FRAMEWORK/STRUCTURE (ARTICLES II-VII)

Articles II through VII of the 1970 Illinois Constitution establish the
framework or structure of Illinois state government. Indeed, the first article
following the Bill of Rights establishes the nature of Illinois state government. Article II, captioned "The Powers of the State," declares in section 1:
"The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch
shall exercise powers properly belonging to another. ' '4 26 Further, lest there
be any misunderstanding, section 2 declares: "The enumeration in this Constitution of specified powers and functions shall not be construed as a limi4 27
tation of powers of state government.
Article III concerns "Suffrage and Elections." As discussed, this subject is appropriate in a discussion of the form or structure of state government. 428 Thus, the 1970 Illinois Constitution recognizes the electorate as the
primary organ of state governmental power prior to establishing the familiar
tripartite governmental structure. Article III, inter alia, restored suffrage to
persons convicted of crimes upon completion of their sentences, 429 created a
State Board of Elections that would have general administrative and supervisory authority over voter registration and elections throughout the state,43 °
and established a general election date.43 1
Article IV concerns the legislature, the Illinois General Assembly,
which consists of a Senate and a House of Representatives.432 There were
several substantive changes made in the 1970 Illinois Constitution. For example, the age requirement for state senators is now the same as for state
representatives-twenty-one years of age.433 Additionally, article IV allows
43 4
for the filling of legislative vacancies by appointment as provided by law.
If the federal decennial census requires reapportionment of state legislative
districts, and if the Illinois General Assembly cannot agree on a redistrict-

426.
ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
427.
Id. § 2. This section merely incorporates the general principle that a state constitution does not grant specified powers and functions to the various branches of state goveminent. "Rather, the Constitution is a limitation on the powers and functions where specified, but state government is not limited as to powers and functions which are not specified."
Helman & Whalen, supra note 379, art. II, § 2, at 573.
428.
See supra text accompanying notes 105-18.
429.
ILL. CONST. art. III, § 2.
430.
Id. § 5.
431.
The general election "shall be held on the Tuesday following the first Monday
of November in even-numbered years or on such other day as provided by law." Id. § 6.
432.

ILL. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.

433.
Id. § 2. Under the 1870 Constitution, state senators had to be at least twenty-five
years old, while state representatives had to be only twenty-one years old. ILL. CONST. of

1870, art. IV, § 3.
434.
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 2(d). The 1870 Constitution required the governor to
"issue writs of election to fill such vacancies." ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IV, § 2.
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ing plan, article IV provides for reapportionment by a bipartisan commission with a tie-breaker procedure as a last resort.435
Turning to legislative procedure, article IV includes several innovations. Article IV mandates annual, rather than biennial, legislative sessions 436 allows the legislature itself, as well as the governor, to convene a
special session;437 and requires a two-thirds super-majority to close the public legislative sessions, and commission and committee meetings. 438 Article
IV replaces the Lieutenant Governor with the President of the Senate as the
presiding officer of the senate. 439 Legislative commissions and committees
must now "give reasonable public notice of meetings, including a statement
of subjects to be considered."" Article IV establishes a veto procedure for
the governor's expanded veto power, and in addition to the formerly-held
power to veto entire bills and line-items of appropriation bills, article IV
also grants the governor a "reduction veto" to reduce appropriations and an
"amendatory veto.'441
Article IV, section 14 provides for the impeachment of executive and
judicial officers:
The House of Representatives has the sole power to conduct legislative investigations to determine the existence of
cause for impeachment and, by the vote of a majority of the
members elected, to impeach Executive and Judicial officers. Impeachments shall be tried by the Senate. When sitting for that purpose, Senators shall be upon oath, or affirmation, to do justice according to the law. If the Governor is tried, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
preside. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senators elected. Judgment shall
not extend beyond removal from office and disqualification
to hold any public office of this State. An impeached officer, whether convicted or acquitted, shall be liable to
prosecution,
trial, judgment and punishment according to
2
44

law.

435.

436.

437.

ILL. CONST. art IV,
Id.§ 5(a).

Id.§ 5(b).

§ 3.

438.
Id. § 5(c).
439.
Id.§ 6(b).
440.
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 7(a).
441.
Id.§9.
442.
Id. § 14. The 1870 Constitution not only established impeachment procedure in
the legislative article, (ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IV, § 24), but also separately provided a
legal standard in the executive article: "The governor, and all civil officers of this state, shall
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Thus, by its plain language, the current impeachment provision "does
not contain any explicit grounds for impeachment, but it simply entrusts the
Illinois House with the right to impeach officials in the executive or judicial
branch and charges the Illinois Senate with the duty to conduct trials of any
impeached official."" 3
Article V of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, concerning the executive
branch of state government, includes several substantive innovations. First,
article V moves the election of executive branch officers to even-numbered,
non-presidential election years. 444 Second, article V lowers the age requirement for governor from thirty to twenty-five years old, and reduces the
state residency requirement from five to three years preceding the election. 445 Third, article V requires that the governor and lieutenant governor
run for office as a team, which a voter would elect jointly in the general
election." 6 Fourth, article V transfersd the canvassing of election returns
from the Illinois General Assembly to the Secretary of State." 7 Finally,
article V allows the governor to reorganize executive agencies directly answerable to the governor."4 The lieutenant governor, who had formerly
presided over the state senate, now only exercises the powers and performs
the duties that the governor delegates and that the law otherwise prescribes. 449
be liable to impeachment for any misdemeanor in office." ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. V, § 15
("Officers liable to impeachment"). At Con-Con, delegates deleted this section in the executive article, preferring to rely on the legislative article as the "all-inclusive impeachment
provision." 3 PROCEEDINGS supra note 305, at 1310-11.
443.
Jerome B. Meites & Steven F. Pflaum, Justice James D. Heiple: Impeachment
and the Assault on JudicialIndependence, 29 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 741, 754 (1998). There is no
other guidance in the 1970 Illinois Constitution or Con-Con proceedings regarding what is
an impeachable offense. Nevertheless, the required constitutional majorities in the Illinois
House of Representatives and Senate concluded that former Governor Rod. R. Blagojevich
committed an impeachable offense and removed him from office. H.R. 1671, 95th Gen.
Assem. (Ill.
2009) (approving article of impeachment); H.R. 5, 96th Gen. Assem. (Il1. 2009)
(reaffirming article of impeachment); Senate Journal, Jan. 29, 2009 (judgment of conviction
and disqualification). Hopefully, such a constitutional process will remain rare and a mere
footnote in Illinois constitutional history.
444.
ILL. CONST. art. V, § 2; see also Joseph A. Tecson, Article V-The Executive
Article, 52 CHI. B. REC. 79, 80 (1970) ("The purpose is to avoid the 'coattail effect' of presidential campaigns and to focus on state issues rather than national issues.").
445.
Compare ILL. CONST. art. V, § 3, with ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. V, § 5.
446.
ILL. CONST. art. V, § 4.
447.
Compare ILL. CONST. art. V, § 5, with ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. V, § 4.
448.
ILL. CONST.art. V, § 11.
449.
Compare ILL. CONST. art. V, § 14, with ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. V, § 18. In
discussing the historical utility of the office of lieutenant governor, one set of scholars have
discerned three arguments for the continued existence of the office: (1) it provides a stepping-stone for politicians who aspire to higher office; (2) if the governor becomes unable to
serve, it guarantees a successor from the same political party; and (3) it provides for a suc-
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Article VI of the 1970 Illinois Constitution establishes and describes
the judicial branch of state government. A mere eight years prior to ConCon, a successful amendment to the 1870 Constitution completely revised
article VI. The Judicial Amendment of 1962 created a much-improved
state
451
judicial system, 450 whose structure Con-Con did not alter.
At the time of the 1962 judicial amendment, Illinois had "a complex
and extensive judicial establishment, consisting of a large number of separate and independent units operating without semblance of co-ordination or
over-all superintendence. ' '4 2 The 1818 Constitution vested the state's judicial power "in one supreme court, and such inferior courts as the general
assembly shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. ' ' 453 The 1848 Constitution vested the state's judicial power in a supreme court, in circuit and
county courts, and in justices of the peace, and authorized the legislature to
establish additional municipal "inferior" courts.4 54 The 1870 Constitution
added to this list of constitutionally established courts "police magistrates,
and such 5courts as may be created by law in and for cities and incorporated
45
towns.
Over the years, the legislature did create such "other inferior courts,"
and all of these courts existed side-by-side.4 56 Jurisdictional and administrative flaws developed. The circuit courts and the Superior Court of Cook
County were the only trial courts of original and unlimited jurisdiction. The
justice-of-the-peace courts and police magistrate courts exercised limited
civil and quasi-criminal jurisdiction, and their decisions were retriable de
cessor without taking another state official away from a significant office.
BROWN, supra note 3, at 98.

KENNEY &

450.
Because the legislature proposed the constitutional amendment in 1961, some
writers have referred to the amendment as "the Judicial Article of 1961." See Harry G. Fins,
Analysis of Illinois JudicialArticle of 1961 and Its Legislative andJudicialImplementation,
11 DEPAUL L. REv. 185, 188 (1962). However, because voters ratified the proposed amendment in 1962, other writers have alternatively referred to the amendment as the "1962 judicial amendment." See BRADEN & COHN, supra note 7; Rubin G. Cohn, The Illinois Judicial
Department-ChangesEffected by Constitution of 1970, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 355 (1971). Further, because the effective date of the judicial amendment was January 1, 1964, there exist
other writers who refer to the amendment as the "1964 Judicial Article." See Wayne W.
Whalen, Article VI-The Judicial Article, 52 CHI. B. REc. 88 (1970). Since voter ratification
was the securing event, this article will refer to the amendment in terms of 1962.
451.
Cohn, supra note 450, at 355.
452.
Samuel W. Witwer, Jr., The Illinois Constitution and the Courts, 15 U. CI. L.
REv. 53, 63 (1947).
453.
ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. IV, § 1.
454.
ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. V, § 1.
455.
ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 1. Also, the 1870 Constitution's charter authorization for Chicago included authorization for the establishment of the Municipal Court of
Chicago and the abolition of justices of the peace and police magistrates in Chicago. ILL.
CONST. of 1870, art. IV, § 34; see supratext accompanying note 204.
456.
BRADEN & COHN, supra note 7, at 329-30; see Witwer, supra note 452, at 64.
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novo in either the county or circuit court at the instance of the losing
party.457 Also, probate courts, municipal courts, and village and town courts
all exercised a limited jurisdiction. Reviewing courts commonly voided
judgments from these courts for lack of jurisdiction, sometimes after years
of litigation. 458 Additionally, the pre-1962 Illinois judicial system suffered
from an administrative flaw.459 Many of these courts operated as independent and virtually autonomous units. For all practical purposes, there was no
means to guide or coordinate this massive system of courts. Judicial resources were wasted at some locations, while courts were overburdened in
other regions.460
The voter ratification of the Gateway Amendment in 1950 "immediately inspired the movement for amendment" of the 1870 judicial article.46'
In 1951, the legislature created the Judicial Article Revision Commission to
study the need for constitutional reform, evaluate suggestions, and draft a
proposed constitutional amendment.462 In 1952, a joint committee of the
Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations (Joint Bar Committee) began
the process by submitting a judicial article amendment. For several years,
the Legislative Commission and the Joint Bar Committee sought consensus
on several versions of a proposed judicial article, which failed in the legislature. In 1957, the legislature adopted a proposed judicial article that was
substantially revised and was the product of many compromises. At the
1958 general election, the proposed judicial article failed to garner the requisite constitutional majority for ratification.463
In 1961, the Joint Bar Commission presented a new proposed judicial
article to the legislature and resubmitted the proposed judicial article that
failed in the 1958 general election. 464 From these two proposals emerged a
compromise judicial article that did not represent the first choice of any
individual or group, but was acceptable "with the hope of improvement in
the future.''65 The legislature adopted the proposed judicial article,466 which
voters ratified in the 1962 general election; it became effective January 1,
1964.
457. BRADEN & COHN,supranote 7, at 329-30; see Witwer, supra note 452, at 64.
458. BRADEN & CoLIN, supranote 7, at 329-30; see Witwer, supra note 452, at 64.
459. BRADEN & COHN, supranote 7, at 330.
460. Id.at 332-33; see Witwer, supra note 452, at 64-65.
461.
See BRADEN & COHN, supra note 7, at 327; see also supra text accompanying
notes 227-3 1.
462. 1951 Ill. Laws 362.
463. 1957 Ill.
Laws 2909; see also BRADEN & COHN, supra note 7, at 327-28; Fins,
supra note 450, at 186-88.
464. Fins, supra note 450, at 188.
465. Id.
466. 1961 I11.
Laws 917.
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The 1962 judicial article was "viewed in objective professional circles
as one of the most far-reaching and constructive reforms in the history of
state constitutional efforts to establish a modem and efficient system for the
administration of justice. ' 4 67 The amended judicial article improved the
Illinois judicial system in at least five areas.468
1. Structure
The 1962 judicial article radically simplified the structure of the Illinois judicial system. Indeed, the amended article began by declaring: "The
judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, an Appellate Court and Circuit
469
Courts."
This single sentence (1) streamlined the Illinois constitutional
judicial structure, (2) withdrew the power of the Illinois General Assembly
to add courts to this simplified structure, (3) constitutionally established the
appellate court, and (4) abolished the above-described hodgepodge of
courts of limited inferior jurisdiction. 470 Further, the 1962 judicial article
conferred upon circuit courts unlimited "original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters," and such powers of review of "administrative action as may
be provided by law."A71 These new trial courts were available to the people
of every county. 472
2.

Administration

It would not have been enough to consolidate the pre-1962 inferior
courts into circuit courts without also providing for their administration.
The 1962 judicial article vested general administrative authority over all
Illinois courts in the Illinois Supreme Court, to be exercised by the Chief
Justice with the assistance of an administrative director and staff. Further,
the 1962 article vested administrative responsibility over each circuit court
in the chief judge of the circuit, subject to the authority of the supreme
court.473 Considered together, experts were satisfied that these provisions
provided a coordinated and efficient general administration of the judicial
system, adapted and applied to local conditions.4 74
467.

468.
(1962).
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
659-60.

& CoRN, supra note 7, at 329.
See Henry P. Chandler, The New JudicialArticle for Illinois, 50 ILL. B.J. 654
BRADEN

ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
BRADEN & CON, supra note 7, at 330.
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
Id. § 8 ("There shall be at least one associate judge from each county.").
Id.§§ 2, 8.
BRADEN & COHN, supra note 7, at 333, 351-52; Chandler, supra note 468, at
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Supreme Court Jurisdiction

Before the 1962 judicial article, the Illinois Constitution imposed upon
the supreme court mandatory appellate jurisdiction "in all criminal cases,
and cases in which a franchise, or freehold, or the validity of a statute is
involved, and in such other cases as may be provided by law. '475 Thus, as a
practical matter, the court had little flexibility in controlling or limiting appeals to it. "Indeed, the quality of cases before it for appellate review virtually destroyed its capacity to function efficiently as a true supreme court,
dealing with important and novel issues of law. '476 The 1962 judicial article
attempted to deal drastically with this problem by severely restricting appeals as of right from the circuit and appellate courts to the supreme court.
Further, the supreme court was authorized with the discretion to hear appeals from the circuit and appellate courts.4 77 It was hoped that this combination of discretionary jurisdiction and limited mandatory appellate jurisdiction would allow the supreme court to fulfill its function of resolving the
issues of greatest importance to the state.478
4.

Supreme Court Districts

The 1870 Constitution established seven judicial districts, from each
of which one supreme court justice would be elected.47 9 One of these districts was composed of Lake, Cook, Du Page, Will, and Kankakee Counties. The legislature could alter the boundaries of these districts based on
equality of population, as nearly as county boundaries would allow.48 °
However, Cook County generated more than half of the state's litigation
and possessed approximately half of the state's population. Consequently,
there were substantial political and professional pressures to equalize the
representation of the single district encompassing Cook County. 48 1 The
475.
ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 11.
476.
BRADEN & COHN, supra note 7, at 340; Cohn, supra note 450, at 357.
477.
The 1962 judicial article limited appeals as of right from circuit courts to final
judgments in cases that involved the following: (1) revenue, (2) federal or state constitutional questions, (3) habeas corpus, and (4) death sentences. The 1962 judicial article limited
appeals as of right from the appellate court to cases in which (1) a federal or state constitutional question arises, and (2) a division of the appellate court certifies that a question of
such importance is involved as justifies a decision by the supreme court. ILL. CONST. art. VI,

§5.

478.
BRADEN & COHN, supra note 7, at 340-41; Chandler, supra note 468, at 660-62.
479.
ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 5.
480.
Id.
481.
BRADEN & CoHN, supra note 7, at 337. According to the 1960 census, 59% of
the state's population resided in this single judicial district and the remaining 41% resided in
the other six judicial districts throughout the state. Chandler, supra note 468, at 663.
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disparity in population among these supreme court districts that developed
subsequent to 1870 was deemed "shocking to any sense of fairness. 48 2
The 1962 judicial article addressed this issue by (1) reducing the number of supreme court judicial districts from seven to five, (2) establishing
Cook County alone as one of the five districts, and (3) reallocating the
seven supreme court justices so that three justices would be elected from
Cook County, and one justice each from the other four districts. 483 Increasing the number of justices elected from Cook County to three, three' 4
sevenths of the total, was seen "as accepted as a reasonable adjustment. 4
5.

Appellate Court

The 1870 Constitution provided that, after 1874, the legislature could
create intermediate appellate courts, consisting of circuit court judges. The
legislature could provide by law for the size, locations, and terms of the
appellate court. Further, the 1870 Constitution provided that no judge sitting on the appellate court could review cases that he or she decided, nor
485
could a judge receive additional compensation for appellate court service.
By law, the supreme court appointed judges to serve on the appellate
4 86
"Having neither a permanent constitutional status nor its own
courts.
and prestige essential to a properly
judiciary, it lacked the independence
87
system."4
judicial
conceived
In response, the 1962 judicial article established an appellate court, organized that court within the five supreme court judicial districts, and provided for appellate court judges, whose selection was coordinated with that
of supreme court judges.4 88 It was hoped that the new appellate court would
fulfill "promptly and efficiently its role as the court of final decision in a
large majority of the cases appealed. And the trial courts will no longer
482.
Based on the 1960 census, six of the seven supreme court justices represented
only 41% of the state's population, while only one justice represented 59% of the state's
population. This disparity led one expert to conclude: "There is no semblance of equality in
the present apportionment." Chandler, supra note 468, at 663.
483.
ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3-4.
BRADEN & COHN, supra note 7, at 337; see also Chandler, supra note 468, at
484.
664 ("A fairer apportionment could not be conceived. It conforms with the legitimate interests for representation in the Supreme Court of both Metropolitan Chicago and the communities downstate.").
ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 11. For details of the pre-1962 appellate courts,
485.
see ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 37, 29 (1959) (Appellate Court Act).
486.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, 29 (1959) ("The supreme court of this state shall
assign twelve of the judges of the circuit court of this state to duty in the appellate courts.");
see BRADEN & CoHN, supra note 7, at 343; Chandler, supra note 468, at 662.
BRADEN & COHN, supra note 7, at 344.
487.
488.
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
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have the energy
of many of their best judges drawn off for work as review89
ing judges.'
Although Con-Con did not alter the state's new judicial structure, ConCon nevertheless added significant improvements. The 1962 judicial article
attempted to alleviate the supreme court's burdensome caseload by drastically restricting the court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction.4 9 ° This remedy, however, proved to be inadequate. One of the post-1962 appeals as of
right, cases involving federal or state constitutional questions, did not deter
industrious counsel from raising constitutional questions to gain mandatory
supreme court review.49'
Section 4 of article VI of the 1970 Illinois Constitution limits appeals
as a right from circuit courts to the supreme court to judgments imposing
death sentences; all other appeals from circuit courts to the supreme court
are left to the supreme court's rulemaking power.492 "The new provision
was drafted to make explicit that the authority over the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction is subject only to the Court's rule making powers and not to
legislation. ' 93
Although the 1962 judicial article abolished masters in chancery and
other fee officers, elected associate judges and appointed magistrates were
retained.49 4 The 1970 Illinois Constitution continued the streamlining of the
state judiciary by abolishing the distinction between circuit and associate
judges, and referring to them as circuit judges. The office formerly known
as "magistrate" was renamed "associate judge.'A95 The new associate judges
are appointed by circuit judges for four-year terms. The supreme court provides by rule for the manner in which circuit judges appoint associate
judges and the matters to be assigned to them.496
Also, the 1962 judicial article inadequately addressed the issue of judicial discipline. It provided for an ad hoc commission of judges to be appointed to hear and determine complaints against judges and to impose
sanctions. 97 This commission could be convened only by the chief justice
on order of the supreme court, or at the request of the state senate.4 98 Soon,
however, this scheme proved to be structurally and procedurally inadequate. Structurally, the commission had no continuity of existence or
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
VI, § 8, at
496.
497.
498.

Chandler, supra note 468, at 663.
See supra text accompanying notes 359-62.
Cohn, supra note 450, at 357.
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b).
Helman & Whalen, supra note 379, art. VI, § 4, at 83.
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
See Cohn, supra note 450, at 365-68; Helman & Whalen, supra note 379, art.
160.
ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 8, 10.
Cohn, supra note 450, at 379.
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 18.

20101

THE 1970 ILNoIs CONSTITUTION: A WELL-TAILORED GARMENT

authority. Procedurally, the 1962 judicial article failed to provide the commission with any investigative, administrative, or enforcement staff.499
The 1970 Illinois Constitution establishes a two-tiered structure devoted to judicial discipline. The first tier is a Judicial Inquiry Board, which
receives and investigates grievances regarding a judge and, if warranted,
files a formal complaint against the judge with the Courts Commission,
which is the second tier of this structure. The Courts Commission is responsible for taking appropriate action on the complaint, including removal
from office if justified. 0 0
Article VII of the 1970 Illinois Constitution pertains to local government. The local governments of Illinois "may be divided into two categories: general purpose units, such as counties, townships, and municipalities;
and those for a special purpose such as school, hospital, drainage, and water
districts., 50 1 Under Dillon's Rule, a local government is deemed to possess
only those powers that were specifically granted to it by the state constitution or by statute. 50 2 Article VII significantly modifies Dillon's Rule in several respects. While article VII's provisions regarding home rule were "the
most talked-about part of the [a]rticle, there is more to it than that., 50 3 Article VII achieves a proper constitutional balance that guarantees local selfstate legislative authority
determination in local matters and also guarantees
50 4
in matters of common statewide concern.
The 1870 Constitution granted only municipalities the authority to
make local improvements-for example, to pave streets, install sidewalks,
streetlights, and sewer and water systems-by imposing a special assessment. 50 5 The 1870 Constitution further specified that a municipality could
only taxes that were "uniform in respect to persons and
assess and50collect
6
property.
Article VII grants the power to make local improvements by special
assessment to all counties, regardless of home rule status.5 °7 Further, article
499.
Cohn, supra note 450, at 379.
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 15; see Cohn, supra note 450, at 385-88; Helman &
500.
Whalen, supra note 379, art. VI, § 15, at 216-18.
KENNEY & BROWN, supra note 3, at 143. Illinois has 102 counties. ILLINOIS
501.
BLUE BOOK 421-38 (Jesse White, ed., 2005-2006). At the time of Con-Con, Illinois had
approximately 1256 municipalities, 1432 townships, 1350 school districts, and 2313 other
special purpose districts. Ebel, supra note 154, at 206.
See supra text accompanying notes 119-21.
502.
503.
John C. Parkhurst, Article VII-Local Government, 52 CHI. B. REc. 94 (1970).
See supra text accompanying note 127.
504.
505.
ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IX, § 9. Section 9 did not "vest the authorities of counties or townships with power to make local improvements by special assessment." People ex
rel. Van Slooten v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 77 N.E. 914, 915 (Ill. 1906).
506.
ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IX, § 9.
507.
ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 7.
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VII abandons the "uniformity" concept by expressly granting to all counties
and municipalities the authority "to levy or impose additional taxes upon
areas within their boundaries in the manner provided by law for the provision of special services to those areas and for the payment of debt incurred
in order to provide those special services.', 50 8 Under article VII, "for the
first time in Illinois, municipalities and counties may impose additional
property taxes on certain areas to pay for special services50 9or special improvements which benefit only a part of the whole district.,
Also, under the 1870 Constitution, units of local government were required to obtain statutory authorization for each cooperative venture. 510
Article VII provides for self-executing, intergovernmental cooperation.
Under section 10 of article VII, units of local government may contract or
otherwise associate among themselves, with the State, with other states and
their units of local government, with school districts, and with the federal
government. Through these arrangements, units of local government may
share services, combine their powers and functions, and use their collective
resources, revenues, and credit to provide local services and solve local
problems, in any manner not prohibited by statute or ordinance. 51 ' ConCon's Committee on Local Government "was confident that this is the most
acceptable, economical and efficient approach to the solution of regional
and area problems that extend beyond corporate boundaries, and are too big
or too complex to be solved by any single unit of local government, acting
alone."512
Undisputedly "one of the most novel provisions" in the 1970 Illinois
Constitution, section 6 of article VII constitutes a "bold, even revolutionary" grant of home rule powers to qualifying municipalities.5 13 As the Illi-

508.
Id. § 6(l)(2) (home rule units); id. § 7(6) (counties and municipalities other than
home rule units).
509.
Parkhurst, supra note 503, at 95. For example, a county can provide fire or
police protection to a new residential development and tax only the property benefitted by
the service. The area taxed need not uniformly include the widely dispersed farms in the
county that do not need special fire or police protection, for which they should not be
charged. Id.
510.
Helman & Whalen, supra note 379, art. VII, § 10, at 417.
511.
ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
512.
Parkhurst, supra note 503, at 97.
GERTZ & PISCIOTrE, supra note 322, at 244. The quality and quantity of schol513.
arly analysis of section 6 of article VII indicate its significance. See, e.g., Joan G. Anderson
& Ann Lousin, From Bone Gap to Chicago: A History of the Local Government Article of
the 1970 Illinois Constitution, 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROP. 698 (1976); David C. Baum,
A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (Part1), 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 137 (1972); David C.
Baum, A Tentative Survey of Illinois Home Rule (PartII): Legislative Control, Transition
Problems, and IntergovernmentalConflict, 1972 U. I1l. L.F. 559 (1972); Paul P. Biebel, Jr.,
Home Rule in Illinois After Two Years: An UncertainBeginning, 6 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. &
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nois Supreme Court explained, the concept of home rule adopted under the
provisions of the 1970 Illinois Constitution "was designed to drastically
alter the relationship which previously existed between local and State government. Formerly, the actions of local governmental units were limited to
those powers which were expressly authorized, implied or essential in carrying out the legislature's grant of authority. ' 114 Prior to 1970, Illinois adhered to Dillon's Rule, which provided that local governments possessed
only those powers that the legislature granted to them.51 5
Section 6, however, reverses the legal philosophy of Dillon's Rule. 516
Section 6(a) of article VII provides:
A County which has a chief executive officer elected by the
electors of the county and any municipality which has a
population of more than 25,000 are home rule units. Other
municipalities may elect by referendum to become home
rule units. Except as limited by this Section, a home rule
unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the pubmorals and welfare; to license; to tax; and
lic health, safety,
51 7
to incur debt.
Section 6(a) was intended to grant home rule units the broadest powers possible. 18 Section 6 additionally provides: "Home rule units may exercise and
perform concurrently with the State any power or function of a home rule
unit to the extent that the Illinois General Assembly by law does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State's
exercise to be exclusive."51 9 Further, "[p]owers and functions of home rule
units shall be construed liberally. 5 20 As a result of these constitutional provisions, home rule units draw their power to regulate for the protection of
public safety directly from the constitution. This power does not depend on
PROp. 253 (1973); Richard A. Michael & Jerry E. Norton, Home Rule in Illinois: A FunctionalAnalysis, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 559 (1978).
1972).
Kanellos v. County of Cook, 290 N.E.2d 240, 243 (I11.
514.
City of Evanston v. Create, Inc., 421 N.E.2d 196, 198 (Ill. 1981) (quoting 4
515.
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 305, at 3034 (remarks of Delegate Parkhurst describing long adherence to Dillon's Rule in Illinois)); GovE &NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 75; see supratext
accompanying notes 119-25.
GoVE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 75; see supra text accompanying notes
516.
119-25.
ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
517.
518.
Helman & Whalen, supra note 379, art. VII, § 6, at 266.
519.
ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(i).
520.
Id.§ 6(m).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

any grant of authority by the Illinois General Assembly, as was the case
prior to 1970. Home rule units now possess the same powers as the state
legislature, except where the legislature limits such powers. 52 I "The long
and short of it [article VII] was that local government in Illinois had clearly
entered a new age. 522
C.

INSTITUTES FUNDAMENTAL POLICY (ARTICLES VIII-XIII)

Articles VIII through XIII of the 1970 Illinois Constitution instituted
several fundamental policies of state government. Article VIII, the finance
article, is new, having no predecessor in the 1870 Constitution. The Committee on Revenue and Finance at Con-Con explained that, in the 1870
Constitution, several provisions pertaining to various aspects of the state's
fiscal procedures appear in the legislative and executive articles; however,
the committee concluded that many of these provisions were archaic and
restrictive. The committee proposed, which Con-Con adopted and the people ratified, a relatively simple and flexible finance article, which allocated
the responsibility for fiscal decision-making between the executive and
legislative branches of state government and opened the entire fiscal process of state and local governments to public scrutiny. 523
Article VIII declares that public funds are to be used only for public
purposes, and that state financial records are public records available for
public inspection. 524 Article VIII directs the governor to prepare and submit
to the Illinois General Assembly an annual balanced budget.5 25 The article
creates the position of auditor general, who is appointed by the legislature
pursuant to a three-fifths vote of each house for a ten-year term. The auditor
general shall audit state funds and report his or her findings to the General
Assembly and the governor. 26 Also, article VIII requires the legislature to
enact laws prescribing the manner in which local governments account and
report the use of public funds. 7
Article IX pertains to revenue. The first sentence of the revenue article
provides: "The General Assembly has the exclusive power to raise revenue
by law except as limited or otherwise provided in this Constitution. '528 This
sentence establishes long-recognized political philosophy as constitutional
521.
Triple A Servs., Inc. v. Rice, 545 N.E.2d 706, 711 (I11. 1989); Kanellos v.
County of Cook, 290 N.E.2d 240, 243 (I11.1972).
522.
GERTZ & PisciorrE, supra note 322, at 261.
523.
7 PROCEEDINGS supra note 305, at 2001, 2007.
524.
ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
525.
Id. § 2.
526.
Id. § 3.
527.
Id. § 4.
528.
Id. art. IX, § 1.
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policy. The State possesses the sovereign power to tax. This inherent power
resides in the legislature; the power of the legislature to tax is plenary and is
restricted only by the federal and state constitutions. 529 This constitutional
policy is intended to foreclose any judicial limitation of the legislature's
inherent power to impose any type of tax. 530 The only constitutional limitations on the legislature's power to tax are expressly stated in the constitution, and they are exclusive.53'
Article IX contains several notable provisions. The article provides
that the Illinois General Assembly may grant property tax exemptions only
for two classes of property: (1) property owned by state and local governments; and (2) property used exclusively for agricultural and horticultural
32
societies, and for school, religious, cemetery, and charitable purposes.5533
sales.
tax
estate
real
to
respect
with
safeguards
The article establishes
Also, article IX permits state debt within prescribed constitutional limitations.534
Article X pertains to education. The education article of the 1870 Constitution required the legislature to establish a system of "good common
school education," that was "thorough and efficient," available to all Illinois
children, and free.5 35 In 1958, the Illinois Supreme Court construed the term
"common school education" to imply the capacity as well as the right to
receive a common school education. The court concluded that then-existing
legislation did not require the state to provide a free educational program,
as part of the common school system, for mentally incompetent children
who were unable to receive a "good common school education. 536 The
education article of the 1870 Constitution received little criticism because
most legal experts had not given attention to the topic; however, "the most
insistent demands for change came from educational experts, who had long
[for] which they . . . hoped a constitutional
been seeking various reforms 537
convention could accomplish.,

529.
Eden Ret. Ctr., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 821 N.E.2d 240, 247 (Ill. 2004).
530.
This was the result of a series of Illinois Supreme Court decisions interpreting
sections 1 and 2 of article IX of the 1870 Constitution. See, e.g., Bachrach v. Nelson, 182
N.E. 909 (Ill. 1932); Helman & Whalen, supra note 379, art. IX, § 1, at 457; Dawn Clark

Netsch, Article IX-Revenue, 52 CHI. B. REc. 103 (1970); J. Nelson Young, The Revenue
Article of the Illinois Constitution of 1970-An Analysis and Appraisal, 1972 U. ILL. L.F.

312.

531.
532.

533.
534.
535.
536.
537.

Helman & Whalen, supranote 379, art. IX, § 1, at 457.
ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 6.

Id.§ 8.
Id.§ 9.
ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VIII, § 1.
Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Haas, 154 N.E.2d 265, 270-71 (Ill. 1958).
BURESH, supra note 6, at 4.
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Con-Con's Committee on Education found that the 1870 Constitution's education article inadequately expressed the importance of education
and "its critical influence on the common welfare. ' 38 The committee
agreed with many witnesses who urged that the education article "be in
harmony with the rising expectations of the people of Illinois for the maximum development of persons of every level of competence, highest to lowof educational experiences that
est, and be consistent with the expansion
539
ahead.,
decades
the
in
occur
may
Section 1 of article X of the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides:
A fundamental goal of the People of the State is the
educational development of all persons to the limits of their
capacities.
The State shall provide for an efficient system of high
quality public educational institutions and services. Education in public schools through the secondary level shall be
free. There may be other such free education as the General
Assembly provides by law.
for financing
The State has the primary5 4responsibility
0
the system of public education.
The Committee on Education recognized that the constitutional objective of the first paragraph "would require expansion beyond the traditional
public school programs. '5 4' The committee explained that the first paragraph "recognizes the need of the person with a physical handicap or mental deficiency who nevertheless is educable. Adults, too, may profit from
further formal education. The objective is to provide each person an opportunity to progress to the limit of his ability. 542 Regarding the third paragraph, Con-Con proceedings conclusively establish that it was not intended
to impose a specific command to or obligation on the Illinois General Assembly. Rather, its purpose was to state only a commitment, purpose, goal,

538.
6 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 305, at 233.
539.
Id.
540.
ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1.
6 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 305, at 234.
541.
Id.; Elliot v. Bd. of Educ., 380 N.E.2d 1137, 1142 n.3 (I1l. App. Ct. 1978)
542.
("Some commentators have noted that article X, section 1 of the Constitution of 1970 supersedes the opinion in Haas."); see Helman & Whalen, supra note 379, art. X, § 1, at 603.
However, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that the first paragraph "is a statement of
general philosophy, rather than a mandate that certain means be provided in any specific
form." Pierce v. Bd. of Educ., 370 N.E.2d 535, 536 (I1. 1977).
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or objective.54 3 Also, article X creates a State Board of Education, which
shall appoint a chief state educational officer. 5 "
Article XI of the 1970 Illinois Constitution pertains to the environment. Section 1 declares: "The public policy of the State and the duty of
each person is to provide and maintain a healthful environment for the
benefit of this and future generations. The General Assembly shall provide
by law for the implementation and enforcement of this public policy." 545 By
the time of Con-Con, the right of each person to enjoy a healthful environment had been recognized in several state constitutions and state legislation. 546 Section 2 of article XI further provides: "Each person has the right
to a healthful environment. Each person may enforce this right against any
party, governmental or private, through appropriate legal proceedings subject to reasonable limitation and regulation as the General Assembly may
provide by law., 547 This provision supersedes the judicially imposed requirement in litigation that the complainant must have suffered "special
damage" in order to have standing to bring an action against alleged polluting activities or persons, or to protect the environment.14 8 The Committee
on General Government, which proposed article XI, emphasized that this
declares that indiarticle does not establish a new remedy; rather, it merely
549
viduals have standing to assert violations of this right.
Article XII institutes the state militia. 550 "Article XIII is a 'catch all'
for miscellaneous provisions. Some of these provisions are carryovers from
55
the old document, some are revisions and some are completely new."
Section 2 of article XIII requires all candidates for, or holders of, state offices and all members of constitutionally created boards and commissions
to file a verified statement of their economic interests as provided by law.
Further, the legislature by law may impose a similar requirement upon candidates for or holders of local government offices.552 Section 4 of article
XIII abolishes the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, except as

Blase v. State, 302 N.E.2d 46, 48-49 (I11. 1973) (citing 5 PROCEEDINGS, supra
543.
note 305, at 4145).
ILL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
544.
ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
545.
546.
Thomas J. McCracken, Articles X and XYI-Environment and General Provisions, 52 CHI. B. REc. 116 (1970).
547.
ILL. CONST.art. XI, § 2.
Helman & Whalen, supra note 379, art. XI, § 2, at 631.
548.
549.
6 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 305, at 701-07; see Helman & Whalen, supra note
379, art. XI, § 2, at 631-33; McCracken, supra note 546 at 117-18.
550.

551.
552.

ILL. CONST. art. XII.

McCracken, supra note 546, at 118.
ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 2.
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the legislature may provide by law. 5 53 The remaining sections of article XIII
pertain to various aspects of public concern: disqualification for public office, oath or affirmation of office, pension and retirement rights, corporations, public transportation, and branch banking.554
D.

PROVIDES REASONABLE AMENDMENT PROCEDURE (ARTICLE XIV)

Lastly and importantly, article XIV of the 1970 Illinois Constitution
significantly liberalizes the constitutional amendment procedure to facilitate
revision by constitutional convention. Indeed, the history of the 1870 Constitution and the efforts leading to Con-Con demonstrated that
the amend555
ment procedure of the 1870 Constitution was too restrictive.
Con-Con retained the two amending methods in the "post-Gateway"
1870 Constitution: legislative proposal and constitutional convention, but
with some variation in the prior procedures and requirements to ease the
requisite majorities and to impose safeguards against hasty and illconsidered action. 556 Con-Con reduced the number of legislators required to
propose a constitutional convention or a constitutional amendment from a
two-thirds majority to a three-fifths majority. A convention will be proposed or an amendment will be approved if, on a separate ballot, voters
approve by three-fifths of those voting on the issue or by a majority of those
voting at the election. 557 Further, once a constitutional convention submits a
proposal to the voters, only a simple majority vote is required to ratify.55 8
Con-Con reasoned that the three-fifths requirement to approve a convention
call, the special election to choose convention delegates, the lengthy deliberative process of a constitutional convention, the required compromise on
a multiplicity of issues, and the publicity and public involvement that a
convention generates, all contribute in guarding against ill-considered ac553.
Id.§ 4. Actually, the Illinois Supreme Court abolished sovereign immunity in
1959. Molitor v. Kaneland Cmty. Unit Dist. No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 (Ill.
1959). In response to Molitor, the legislature enacted the Tort Immunity Act. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
10/1-101 to 10/10-101 (West 2006). The Tort Immunity Act adopted the general principle
that local governmental units are liable in tort, but limited this liability with an extensive list
of immunities based on specific government functions. Governmental Interinsurance Exch.
v. Judge, 850 N.E.2d 183, 195 (I11.
2006).
554.
ILL. CONST. art. XIH, §§ 1, 3, 5-8.
555.
See supratext accompanying notes 202-33.
556.
7 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 305, at 2267.
557.
ILL. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 1 (calling for a constitutional convention), 2 (proposing
an amendment by General Assembly); see also Peter A. Tomei, Articles III and XIV and
Separate Question No. 4-Suffrage, Elections and ConstitutionalRevision, 52 CHI. B. REC.
71, 74 (1970) ("Under the three-fifths test, 11 of the 15 constitutional amendments submitted
to the voters since 1950 would have passed, as opposed to 6 out of 15 that actually were
adopted.").
558.
ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1(g).
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tion and, consequently, make a simple majority voter ratification requirement reasonable.55 9
Additionally, article XIV expands the convention method of constitutional amendment by including the periodic and automatic placement on the
ballot of the question of whether a constitutional convention shall be
called. 560 A convention call must be submitted to voters at least once every
twenty years. 56 1 "This provision is based on the premise that the people
should have a recurrent opportunity to decide whether they want to make a
review of the structure and organization of their governwide-ranging
, 562
ment.
The foregoing discussion of the 1970 Illinois Constitution demonstrates that the current fundamental document of Illinois does what a state
constitution is supposed to do-i.e., (1) declare and guarantee the rights and
liberties of the people, (2) establish the framework or structure of Illinois
state government, and (3) institute fundamental policy. Also, the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides for a more enlightened amendment procedure
than its 1870 predecessor.
The efficacy of the 1970 Illinois Constitution's amendment procedure
can be measured by its adaptability. Indeed, the efficacy of the constitution
as a whole can be measured by examining the amendments to the 1970 Illinois Constitution.
V.

ADAPTABILITY OF 1970 ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION

"The test of time has shown that the package approved in 1970 seems
to be working for the people and the special interests of Illinois; no major
efforts have been initiated to discard it."'563 A constitutional amendment
initiated in the Illinois General Assembly must receive a three-fifths apTomei, supra note 557, at 75.
Con-Con recognized that the general assembly would unlikely propose changes
to the constitutional article pertaining to itself (i.e., article IV). Accordingly, section 3 of
article XIV provides a very limited voter initiative for proposing amendments to article IV.
Voters may propose amendments to article IV by a petition signed by at least 8% of the total
votes cast for governor in the preceding election. Such a proposed amendment must be limited to matters that are both structural and procedural and must include substantive matters.
Also, the subject matter of the proposed amendment must be found in the legislative article.
ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3; see Chi. Bar Ass'n v. State Bd. of Elections, 641 N.E.2d 525, 528
(Ill. 1994); Chi. Bar Ass'n v. State Bd. of Elections, 561 N.E.2d 50, 55 (Ill. 1990); Coal. for
Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections, 359 N.E.2d 138, 144 (Ill. 1977); Helman &
Whalen, supra note 379, art. XIV, § 3, at 686.
559.

560.
561.
562.
563.

7 PROCEEDINGS,

supra note 305, at 2267, 2278-79.

ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § I(b).
Tomei, supra note 557, at 74.
GovE &NowLAN, supra note 185, at 76.
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proval in each house, and voter ratification by either three-fifths of those
voting on the amendment or by a majority of those voting in that election. 56 As of this writing, the Illinois General Assembly has proposed seventeen amendments to the 1970 Illinois Constitution and, of these, voters
have ratified ten. Serving the general purposes of state constitutions, these
amendments (1) declare and guarantee the rights of the people, (2) establish
the framework
or structure of government, and (3) institute fundamental
565
policy.
A.

RIGHTS

The legislature has proposed four amendments to article I of the 1970
Illinois Constitution-the Illinois Bill of Rights-all involving criminal
procedure. The third amendment,5 66 ratified in 1982, amended section 9 to
add to the list of nonbailable offenses those offenses for which a life sentence could be imposed. 567 The fourth amendment, ratified in 1986, further
expanded the list of nonbailable offenses. 568 The seventh amendment, ratified in 1992, added "Crime Victim's Rights" to the Illinois Bill of Rights.5 69
This section establishes that crime victims have rights including the right to
communicate with the prosecution, notification of court proceedings, make
5 70
a statement to the court at the defendant's sentencing, and restitution.
Further, the section clarifies that the Illinois General Assembly may enact
enforcement legislation, 7 ' and that the section or any supporting legislation
shall not "be construed as creating a basis for vacating a conviction or a
ground for appellate relief in any criminal case. 5 72 The eighth amendment,
ratified in 1994, amended section 8-"Rights after Indictment"-to substitute a defendant's right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him or
her" for the original right "to meet the witnesses face to face. 573

ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 2.
565.
See supra text accompanying note 73.
566.
The Illinois Blue Book lists in chronological order the ratified amendments to
the Illinois Constitution. ILLINOIS BLUE BOOK, supra note 501, at 533-34, 566-67.
567.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9 (amended 1982).
568.
Id. (amended 1986) (expanding the list of nonbailable offenses to include felony
offenses "when the court, after a hearing, determines that release of the offender would pose
a real and present threat to the physical safety of any person").
569.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1 (amended 1992).
570. Id.
564.

571.

Id. § 8.1(b).

573.

Id. § 8 (amended 1994).

572.

Id. § 8.1(d).
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B.

STRUCTURE

The legislature has proposed a total of five amendments to the 1970 Illinois Constitution pertaining to the framework or structure of Illinois state
government. Of these, voters have ratified four. The first amendment, ratified in 1980, is popularly known as the "Cutback Amendment. 57 4 It
amended the legislative article to reduce the size of the state house of representatives and eliminate cumulative voting. 7 5 The fifth amendment, ratified
in 1988, amended the article on suffrage and elections to lower the voting
age from twenty-one to eighteen years of age and lowered the voting residency requirement from six months to thirty days.576 The ninth amendment,
ratified in 1994, amended the legislative article to encourage the Illinois
General Assembly to enact legislation sooner. Bills passed after May 31 are
not effective until June 1 of the following year, unless passed by a threefifths supermajority.Y77 The tenth amendment, ratified in 1998, amended the
citizens, appointed by the governor, to the Illinois
judicial article to add
57
Commission.
Courts
A proposed amendment relating to the structure of state government
failed.579 In 1974, the legislature proposed an amendment in response to a
perceived abuse of the amendatory veto. The proposed amendment would
have significantly curtailed the amendatory veto as Illinois governors had
historically used it. Governor Ogilvie used the amendatory veto "vigorously
from the time it was first available to him in 1971. Governor Walker continued that practice in 1973 and thereafter, and he gave the amendatory veto
a new spin when he held an important bill hostage to secure approval of
changes he had proposed in another. 5 80 The proposed amendment would
have restricted the governor's power to return bills to the legislature to
"technical errors or matters of form."' ' The proposed amendment failed to
receive approval from a constitutional majority of those voting in the 1974
November general election.5 82

GovE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 77; ILLINOIS BLUE BOOK, supra note 501.
574.
ILL. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1-3 (amended 1980).
575.
Id. art. III, § 1 (amended 1988).
576.
Id. art. IV, § 10 (amended 1994).
577.
Id.art. VI, § 15 (amended 1998).
578.
Laws 3101.
579.
House J. Res. Const. Amend. 7, 1973 I11.
KENNEY & BROWN, supra note 3, at 84. Although the governor may not use the
580.
amendatory veto to replace the bill passed by the legislature with an entirely new bill, the
governor is not limited to correcting formal or technical errors. Kane County v. Carlson, 507
N.E.2d 482, 493 (Ill. 1987).
Laws 3101.
581.
House J. Res. Const. Amend. 7, 1973 I11.
582.

RYAN'S ILLINOIS BLUE BOOK, supra note 3, at 559.
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POLICY

The legislature has proposed a total of eight amendments pertaining to
the fundamental policy of Illinois state government. Of these, voters have
ratified two. The second amendment, ratified in 1980,583 and the sixth
amendment, ratified in 1990, 584 both modified the availability and parameters of delinquent property tax sales.
Voters, however, have rejected six additional proposed amendments
relating to Illinois fundamental policy.58 5 In 1978, the legislature proposed

two amendments to the revenue article. One proposed amendment would
have deleted the constitutional mandate that the legislature abolish the personal property tax as of January 1, 1979.586 Another proposed amendment
would have allowed the legislature to grant a property tax exemption to
587
f
Voters failed to ratify both
property used for veterans' organizations.
proposed amendments at the 1978 November general election. 88 In 1984
and again in 1986, the legislature proposed an amendment that would have
allowed the grant of a veterans' organization property tax exemption.5 9 In
each of the 1984 and 1986 November general elections, voters failed to
ratify the proposed amendments.590 In 1988, voters failed to ratify a proposed amendment that would have enhanced a property owner's right of
redemption of tax delinquent property.59' In 1992, voters failed to ratify a
proposed amendment to the education article that would have declared education to be a fundamental right, guaranteed equal educational opportunity,
and established that "[t]he State has the preponderant
financial responsibil592
education.
public
of
system
the
financing
for
ity
Generally, constitutional changes are "the result of many interacting
social, economic, and political forces. And conversely, the blocking of constitutional changes will be the result of the interactions of other social, eco583.
ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 8 (amended 1980); see ILLINOIS BLUE BOOK, supra note
501, at 533.
584.
ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 8 (amended 1990); see ILLINOIS BLUE BOOK, supra note
501, at 533.
585.
See infranotes 586-92 and accompanying text.
586.
80th 111. Gen. Assem., 1978 Sess., 2 Legis. Synopsis & Dig. 1808-09; see ILL.
CONST. art. IX, § 5(c).
587.
80th Ill. Gen. Assem., 1978 Sess., 2 Legis. Synopsis & Dig. 1815-17; see ILL.
CONST. art. IX, § 6.
588.
RYAN'S ILLINOIS BLUE BOOK, supra note 3, at 559.
589.
House J. Res. Const. Amend. 2, 1984 I11.Laws 4529; S. J. Res. Const. Amend.
11, 1986 I11.
Laws 4900.
590.
RYAN'S ILLINOIS BLUE BOOK, supra note 3, at 559.
591.
House J. Res. Const. Amend. 13, 1988 Ill. Laws 4149; see ILL. CONST. art. LX, §
8; RYAN'S ILLINOIS BLUE BOOK, supra note 3, at 559.
592.
S. J. Res. Const. Amend. 130, 1992 111.Laws 4582; see ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1;
RYAN'S ILLINOIS BLUE BOOK, supra note 3, at 559.
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nomic, and political forces. 5 93 The successful and unsuccessful attempts to
amend the 1970 Illinois Constitution clearly exemplify this truism. Considering that the legislature has proposed only seventeen constitutional
amendments, of which voters have ratified only ten, constitutional amendment in Illinois apparently is neither too easy nor too difficult.

VI.

1988 AUTOMATIC CONVENTION CALL

"The strongest measure of the value of the staying power of the 1970
convention is that voters rejected an opportunity to call for a new convention., 594 Section l(b) of article XIV of the 1970 Illinois Constitution provides: "If the question of whether a Convention should be called is not
submitted during any twenty-year period, the Secretary of State shall submit such question at the general election in the twentieth year following the
last submission. 595 The Illinois Attorney General opined that the first
automatic convention call should be submitted to voters in 1988, rather than
1990.596 The attorney general explained that a convention call was last
submitted to voters in 1968, which resulted in Con-Con; therefore, 1988
would be the twentieth year following the last submission.5 97
The Illinois General Assembly convened a "Committee of Fifty" to reexamine the Illinois Constitution. The committee was a voluntary organization composed of the governor, the president of Con-Con, and others including scholars, government officials, and legal experts. The legislature's
mandate to the committee was to help advise the legislature and the public
on constitutional issues.598 The legislature directed the Committee of Fifty
to reconvene Con-Con delegates to assess the 1970 Illinois Constitution,
hold open meetings throughout the state for discussion of constitutional
issues, and prepare public reports with commentary and recommendations
on government structure and operation. 599 The Committee of Fifty fulfilled
its mission. It reconvened Con-Con delegates, who did not express any sentiment in favor of another constitutional convention. 6 00 Also, inthe spring
of 1988, the committee held eight public meetings throughout the state.
Bartley, supra note 167, at 22.
593.
594.
GOVE & NoWLAN,supra note 185, at 77.
ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § l(b).
595.
1987 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. 246.
596.
See supra text accompanying note 3.
597.
Laws 4931.
S.J. Res. 101, 1986 Ill.
598.
Id.
599.
600.
See GovE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 77; KENNEY & BROWN, supra note 3,
at 237; Ronald C. Smith, Another Con-Con? Just Say "No, " 77 ILL. B.J. 82, 96 n.88 (1988).
To be sure, Con-Con delegates expressed concern regarding the document that they drafted.
They generally agreed that the State had failed in implementing the anti-discrimination
provisions in the Bill of Rights (ILL. CONST., art. I, §§ 16-18), and in undertaking the pri-
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Further, during this time, various interest groups expressed opposition
to a convention for various reasons. Some groups believed that the 1970
Constitution had served the state well; other groups questioned the cost of
another convention.6 °2 Convention opponents eventually formed a "Committee to Preserve the Illinois Constitution." This broad-based coalition
included historically unlikely allies, such as the Illinois State Chamber of
Commerce and the Illinois AFL-CIO. 6 3 This coalition raised approximately
$600,000 to fund its anti-convention campaign, and spent most of it for
television and radio advertising during the week prior to the election. 604 The
committee emphasized the following dangers of a convention: the guarantee of equal rights to women, minorities, and the handicapped might be lost;
and that divisive issues, e.g., abortion, gun control, school prayer, would
dominate convention proceedings.60 5 At the 1988 November general election, voters rejected the convention call by approximately a three to one
margin of those who voted on the question.606
VII.

2008 AUTOMATIC CONVENTION CALL

The reasons expressed in 1988 for rejecting a convention call remained valid against a 2008 convention call. One must first consider ConCon and its product, the 1970 Illinois Constitution. Con-Con must be recognized as a unique event in Illinois political history:
The 1970 Con-Con was a success for a great many reasons
including the social and political milieu of the late [1960s],
a supportive legislature, over 20 years of scholarly research
and debate, good luck, a balanced body of delegates, an
overriding concern that the Illinois Constitution shed 100
years of rags and chains, and a proposed constitution which
was widely hailed as balanced and progressive.60 7
mary obligation of financing public education (ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1). KENNEY & BROWN,
supra note 3, at 234.
601.
KENNEY & BROWN, supra note 3, at 237.
602.
GOVE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 77-78; KENNEY & BROWN, supra note 3, at
237-40.
603.
KENNEY & BROWN, supra note 3, at 240; Smith, supra note 600, at 96; see Jeff
Brody, Unlikely Allies Join Biz to Fight Con-Con, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus., Oct. 10, 1988, at 3.
604.
KENNEY & BROWN, supra note 3, at 240.
605.
See id.; Committee to Preserve the Illinois Constitution, Illinois State Constitution: Should A ConstitutionalConvention Be Called? No, CHI. TRiB., Oct. 30, 1988, Voter's
Guide 1988, at 5; Mark Hornung, Coalition Working to Halt Strong Pro-Con-Con Effort,
CRAIN'S CHI. Bus., Oct. 31, 1988, at2.
606.
See GovE & NOWLAN, supra note 185, at 78; supra text accompanying note 3.
607.
Smith, supra note 600, at 96.
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Indeed, Con-Con's ultimate product, the 1970 Illinois Constitution, was a substantial improvement over its 1870
predecessor.
Most importantly, the 1970 convention did what its proponents promised it would do. It eliminated the defects of the
1870 Constitution, reordered the delicate balances within
Illinois government, reformed and strengthened each
branch of government, improved the bill of rights, delegated power to major municipalities, and maintained the
status quo where either desirable or expedient. The 1970
Constitution provided Illinois with a modem, flexible, and
progressive constitution-a constitution which was designed to last for generations and not just for the passing
hour.6 °8
Any perceived flaws in the 1970 Illinois Constitution exist because the
document was the result of much compromise between many competing
interests. In sum, the 1970 Illinois Constitution "is a sound document which
by no means requires the type of overhaul which a convention would be
inclined to make. 60 9
As early as the autumn of 2007, magazines and newspapers began to
remind-or inform-Illinois voters of the upcoming 2008 automatic convention call. 610 During the following months, many articles explained the
"pros" and "cons" of a 2010 state constitutional convention.6 1' Proponents
contended that only constitutional revision could satisfy their grievances
against allegedly unnecessary township government, 612 excessive gubema614
torial power, 613 inequitable taxation and other revenue practices, and ex.

...

608.
Id.at 87.
609.
Id.at 96.
See, e.g., Pat Guinane, Con-Con Revisited, ILL. ISSUES, Nov. 2007, at 20; Dana
610.
Heupel, Buzz About Con-Con Begins: Decision to Rewrite State Constitution Up to Voters in
2008, SPRINGFIELD ST.J.-REG., Sept. 17, 2007, at 1.
611.
Editorial, Legislature Building Case for Constitutional Convention,
BLOOMINGTON PANTAGRAPH, Apr. 23, 2008; Patrick Ferrell, Does Illinois Need a New Constitution?, JOLIET HERALD NEWS, Oct. 6, 2008; Bethany Jaeger, Q & A: Con-Con, ILL.
ISSUES, Oct. 2008, at 25; Ed Murnane, Sneaking Up on the Outside: It's Con-Con 2008,
MADISON COUNTY REc., Feb. 23, 2008; James D. Nowlan et al., Is There A Con-Con in
Illinois' Future?, ILL. REP. 2008 (Institute of Government & Public Affairs), at 87; Rick
Pearson, UnusualAlliances Form in State Constitution Vote, CHI. TRiB., Oct. 24, 2008, § 1,

at 25.
Brian Slupski, Township Group Edgy About Convention, NORTHWEST HERALD,
612.
Aug. 24, 2008.
613.
Brian J. Gaines, Keep Them Separated?, ILL. ISSUES, Jan. 2008, at 19.
614.
Aaron Chambers, Chancefor Change, ILL. ISSUES, Feb. 2008, at 27.
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cessive accumulation of power by a few government leaders. 61 5 A constitutional revision could have established sought-after structural changes such
as referendum and recall, term limits, and the appointment rather than the
election 7of judges, 616 and found solutions to any number of various
61
causes.

However, the ability to correct any perceived flaws in the 1970 Illinois
Constitution through the convention process was weighed against the disadvantages and risks of a constitutional convention. Con-Con delegates
were each paid a $5000 base salary in eight monthly installments of $625, a
$75 per diem salary plus modest travel, lodging, and meal expenses at the
prescribed government rate, and a $120 postage allotment.618 Alone, this
initial appropriation totaled $2,083,849. Costs of statewide primary and
run-off elections for Con-Con delegates, salaries and expenses of convention staff, housing, statewide public hearings and mailing of the official
explanation, and the December 1970 referendum, constituted additional
expenses.619 "The grand total appropriated was $14,764,778, of which
$13,924,063 was spent., 620 It is axiomatic that, accounting for inflation,
these expenses would be much greater today.62'
To economize in planning a future state constitutional convention generally, the legislature could pay delegates low salaries, which would attract
only a limited range of delegate candidates and discourage delegate diversity, as occurred at the 1920 Fifth Illinois Constitutional Convention.622
Those delegates who were independently wealthy were unable or unwilling
to devote their time exclusively to the proceedings. Conversely, those delegates who were not wealthy were required to continue to pursue their nor623cuth
mal livelihoods as a matter of economic necessity.
To further cut the
615. Dennis Byrne, DemocraticLeaders Need ConstitutionalJolt, CHI. TRIB., Aug.
5, 2008; Editorial, Vote Yes on Con-Con, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5, 2008, § 1, at 29; Rich Miller,
Fearof Ordinary Citizens Behind "No " Vote Push, J.NEWS, July 20, 2008.
616. Gregory F. Augustine Pierce, Commentary, IfNot Now, When?, CHI. TRaB., July
1, 2008, at 15.
617. John Fritchey, Op-Ed., Time Is Right To Hold A "Con-Con," SPRINGFIELD ST.
J.-REG., Nov. 10, 2007, at 14.
618. GERTZ & PISCIOTTE, supra note 322, at 364-67 (App. III);
Smith, supra note
600, at 86; see Pub. Act 76-40, §§ 8, 18, 1969 Ill. Laws 57, 64, 67, reprinted in 1
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 305, at 838-39.
619. GERTZ & PISCIOTrE, supra note 322, at 364-67 (App. II); Smith, supra note
600, at 86; see Pub. Act 76-40, §§ 8, 18, 1969 I11.
Laws 57, 64, 67, reprinted in 1
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 305, at 838-39.
620. Smith, supra note 600, at 86.
621. Opponents of a 2010 constitutional convention estimated its projected cost as
high as $78 million; however, proponents estimated the projected cost as low as $23 million.
See, e.g., Ferrell, supra note 611; Guinane, supra note 610; Pearson, supra note 611.
622. Smith, supra note 600, at 92.
623. Tomei, supra note 295, at 183-84.
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costs of a constitutional convention, the legislature could provide for minimal staff and other resources, but this would engender such inefficiency and
delay in the proceedings as to induce voter apathy or hostility.624
A 2010 constitutional convention not only had the above-described
disadvantages, but also had attendant risks. It could have been either a "runaway" or a legislature-controlled "rubber-stamp" convention. Either type
would have done some "serious surgery" on many constitutional provisions
that resulted from compromise between interests, ideologies, and groups
statewide. These disadvantages and risks would have produced the ultimate
risk-voter rejection of a proposed constitution. 625 "Given the risks, the
realities26 and the expense, the conclusion [was] . . . apparent. Just say
6
'No."'
Opponents of a 2010 constitutional convention, including labor unions
and business organizations, formed "The Alliance to Protect the Illinois
Constitution., 627 Members of the Alliance included the Illinois AFL-CIO,
the Illinois Business Roundtable, Illinois Chamber of Commerce, Illinois
Retail Merchants Association, Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, and the
League of Women Voters of Illinois. 628 This collection of diverse special
interests agreed that the solution to the problems of state government was
not convening a constitutional convention, but rather to elect better leaders. 629 The Alliance was expected to raise approximately $3 million for its
campaign in opposition to a convention. 630
A.

"MISLEADING" NOTICE AND EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED CALL

Unfortunately, by forgetting the Illinois constitutional history as herein
recounted, the political debate regarding the 2008 automatic convention call
spilled over into the courts. Whenever circumstances require a convention
call, the Illinois Secretary of State is required by law to include on the convention call ballot a notice and a brief explanation of the proposed call. 631
Further, at least one month prior to the election, the Secretary of State must

624.
Smith, supra note 600, at 93.
625.
Id.at 92-94.
626.
Id.at 96.
627.
Adriana Colindres, State Needs Better Leaders, Not a New Constitution, Accordingto Alliance, PEORIA J. STAR, July 14, 2008.
628.
Id.
629.
Id.
630.
Id.; Bob Tita, Spelling Out "Con-Con" Cons: Biz Raising Millions to Argue
ConstitutionalRewrite is a BadIdea, CRAIN'S CHI. Bus., June 23, 2008, at 2.
631.
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 25/1 (West 2006); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-6
(West 2006).
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publish this notice and explanation in local newspapers and also in a pamphlet that is mailed to every mailing address in the state.632
Pursuant to these statutory requirements, the Secretary of State mailed
to voters the explanation of the 2008 proposed call, which would appear on
the ballot as follows:
Explanation of Proposed Call
This proposal deals with the call for a state constitutional
convention. The last such convention was held in 1969-70,
and a new Constitution was adopted in 1970. The 1970 Illinois Constitution requires that the question of calling a
convention be placed before the voters every 20 years. In
1988 the electors rejected the callfor a constitutionalconvention, with 75% voting againstcalling a convention and
25% voting in favor of calling a convention. If you believe
the 1970 Illinois Constitution needs to be revised through
the convention process, vote "YES" on the question of calling a constitutionalconvention. If you believe that a constitutional convention is not necessary, or that changes can
be accomplished through other means,
vote "NO" on the
633
calling of a constitutionalconvention.
On the ballot, this explanation was preceded by the following statutory language:
NOTICE
THE FAILURE TO VOTE THIS BALLOT IS THE
EQUIVALENT OF A NEGATIVE VOTE. (THIS IS
NOT TO BE CONSTRUED AS A DIRECTION THAT
YOUR VOTE IS REQUIRED TO BE CAST EITHER
IN FAVOR OF OR IN OPPOSITION634 TO THE
PROPOSITION HEREIN CONTAINED."
This notice is required by section 16-6 of the Election Code, which
was enacted in 1949 as part of the drive to enact the "Gateway Amendment" to the 1870 Illinois Constitution.63 5

632.
633.

5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 25/1 (West 2006).

JESSE WHITE, PROPOSED CALL FOR A STATE OF ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL

CONVENTION 3 (2008) (emphasis added).
634. See 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.

635.

5/16-6 (West 2006).

See supra text accompanying notes 227-31.
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On September 19, 2008, plaintiffs, the Chicago Bar Association, Lieutenant Governor Pat Quinn, and individual voters, filed a declaratory judgment action in the circuit court of Cook County against defendants, the Illinois Secretary of State and various election officials. Plaintiffs challenged
the notice and the italicized language in the explanation.636 Plaintiffs contended that the notice would misinform voters that leaving the ballot blank
would have the effect of voting against a convention. Plaintiffs argued that
the notice was correct under the 1870 Illinois Constitution, which was in
effect when the notice was created in 1949; however, plaintiffs argued that
the notice is incorrect under the 1970 Illinois Constitution.
Plaintiffs also posited that the explanation must be solely explanatory,
and not unfair or biased. Plaintiffs argued that the italicized language in the
explanation was not explanatory because it told voters nothing about the
2008 convention call, and that this language was biased in that it suggested
alternatives to holding a convention.63 7
The circuit court found that the contested language was inaccurate and
misleading; however, election officials testified that there was not enough
time to correct the ballot itself prior to the November 4, 2008 election.638
On October 6, 2008, the circuit court formulated a remedy in its final order.
The circuit court directed defendants to distribute a "corrective notice" to
voters along with the ballot. This corrective notice provided a new explanation of the proposed call, in which the italicized language was deleted, and
which directed voters simply to vote639"yes" to support the calling of a convention, or to vote "no" to oppose it.
Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal that same day. On October 15, 2008,
the appellate court heard oral argument. 640 Plaintiffs argued that the correct
notice did not remedy the infirmities in the ballot. Plaintiffs asked the appellate court to order defendants to issue new and separate ballots for voters. 64' On October 16, 2008, the appellate court entered a judgment affirming the circuit court. On October 28, 2008, the appellate court filed an opinion explaining that the circuit court's chosen remedy under the circumstances was not an abuse of discretion. 642 At the November 2008 general
election, voters overwhelmingly rejected the call for a state constitutional
convention, which received 1,493,203 affirmative votes and 3,062,724
negative votes.643
636.
637.
638.
639.
640.
641.
642.
643.

Chi. Bar Ass'n v. White, 898 N.E.2d 1101, 1104-05 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
Id. at 1106.
Id.at 1107-08.
Id.at 1105.
Id.at 1104.
White, 898 N.E.2d at 1105.
Id. at 1104.
See Illinois State Board of Elections, supranote 4.
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CONCLUSION

In urging voter ratification of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, Delegate
Tomei observed: "If the 1970 Constitution proves over the years to be a
generally acceptable expression of fundamental law, and if the legislature is
responsive in placing before the electors such amendments as from time to
time may be needed, voter approval of a constitutional convention should
be rendered unnecessary." 644 Nearly forty years later, this observation remains persuasive. This article has explained the history, theory, and purposes of state constitutions in the American political system. The article
recounted the background, framing, and ratification of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution, and the controversy that ensued as a consequence of forgetting that history. This article then described the contents of the Illinois Constitution, and explained how the document fulfills the general purposes of
state constitutions. This article has demonstrated that the Illinois Constitution remains adaptable to new situations and changing circumstances. "A
constitutional convention cannot succeed unless it is really needed and
wanted, as was the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention. If one is not
sure that new deliberations will lead to a better charter, there is little point
in starting this long, involved, and frequently frustrating process." 645 Based
on the foregoing, voters correctly voted "No" for the call for a state constitutional convention at the November 2008 general election.

644.
Tomei, supra note 557, at 74; accord KENNEY & BROWN, supra note 3, at 231
("If [constitutional] change can occur by amendment as needed, there should be little reason
for the voters to opt for a convention when the question is presented to them.").
645.
GERTZ & PISCIOTTE, supra note 322, at 341-42. It is axiomatic that "[any attempt to improve on a system that already works is pointless and may even be detrimental."
TITELMAN, supra note 5, at 152 (defining the popular phrase: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it").

